893.51/6985: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:30 p.m.]
592. Department’s telegram 112, August 2, 8 p.m.50 The following information has been received in strict confidence from the source mentioned in Embassy’s despatch 882, January 21, 193851 and was provided with the request that every effort be made to safeguard not only the source and Moscow origin but the contents thereof.
Soviet assistance to China in equipment, material, nurses, supplies, since the beginning of the Japanese-Chinese conflict has in quantity been much more than that obtained from all other countries together and has been largely financed by long-term credits at low rates extended by the Soviet Union to China. Last June a credit of nearly 200,000,000 dollars was granted which brought the total of Soviet credits since the beginning of the conflict to 500,000,000 dollars. Approximately 1,000 aircraft consisting of S B bombers and pursuit planes have been delivered by the Soviet Union to China together with large quantities of arms especially light field pieces and machine guns. Approximately 2,000 Soviet pilots in rotation have been given combat practice with the Chinese air force.
The supplies with the exception of the [airplanes] which were flown in have gone by two routes (1st) through Sinkiang and (2) by ship from the Black Sea to South China especially Canton before its capture by the Japanese. These purchases have been arranged through special Chinese missions to Moscow particularly those headed by Sun Fo. Although the Soviet Government has consistently endeavored through promises of further and continuous supplies to have the Chinese Government immediately utilize the equipment and material thus delivered, the Chinese Government has been following a policy of building up appreciable reserves from these supplies and has resisted Soviet attempts to have the number of Russian pilots and technicians increased. The purpose of this policy of the Chinese Government has been and is to prevent at any time too great a dependence upon future supplies from the Soviet Union as the possibility has always been contemplated that this source might at any time be shut off. Up until recently the Soviet Government has discouraged without definitely opposing serious attempts on the part of the Chinese Government to seek its chief source of supply from other countries but 2 days ago upon inquiry here the Soviet Government [Page 262] intimated that there was now no objection to China seeking such assistance from England, France, or the United States although doubt was expressed whether supplies would be made available from those countries.
My informant outlined in detail and with apparent frankness the Chinese policy in regard to the Soviet Union. He stated that it has been the constant desire of the Chinese Government to avoid becoming too dependent upon Russia or to permit Russian influence in the Chinese Government and Army to become in any way dominant. He felt that in this the Chinese Government had been successful. He admitted, however, that his Government was distinctly concerned with the possibility of a rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union of which he considered the settlement of the Mongolian-Manchurian border dispute a first step although up to the present there had been no indication of any change in Soviet attitude toward China as a result of the Soviet-German treaty and the Soviet invasion of Poland and that supplies were still being regularly delivered.
My informant stated that Japanese overtures looking toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict with China had increased of late and attempts had been made to persuade the Chinese Government that the real enemy of China was not Japan but foreign powers enjoying special interests and particularly England and that Japan and China should cooperate in a policy of “Asia for the Asiatics”. He added that while these overtures from Japan had found a response in certain Chinese governmental quarters nevertheless Chiang Kai Shek was of the opinion that time was on the side of China, that Japan had failed to conquer China and would seek increasingly to limit its operations in China and that consequently better terms of peace could be obtained at a later date possibly at the end of another 6 months or a year.
While it is of course impossible to check the accuracy of this information from any other source, I am inclined to believe that the statements in regard to Soviet aid to China are substantially correct and in this connection refer to Embassy’s telegram No. 265, of October 14, 1937, 10 p.m.52 The purpose of these disclosures from a source which has heretofore been not only reticent but inclined to play down the extent of Soviet aid is I believe clearly due to concern at the possibility of a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement followed by a cessation of Soviet aid to China and the desire to ascertain the possibility of obtaining assistance from other countries, in particular the United States. It may well be that, despite the statement that there has been no change in Soviet attitude, my informant has received intimations that such a change is imminent.
- Not printed; it requested information (893.51/6984).↩
- Not printed.↩
- Quoted in telegram No. 1458–1460, October 16, 1937, 10 p.m., from the Chargé in France, Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. iii, p. 616.↩