803.0146/708
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been actively considering in conjunction with the French Government the communication made to their respective Ambassadors in Tokyo on September 5th by the Japanese Government offering the “friendly advice” that they should voluntarily withdraw their troops and warships from those regions of China which are under the control of the Japanese forces. In considering how best to reply to this proposal his Majesty’s Government have naturally given full weight to the various communications on the subject made recently by the State Department to His Majesty’s Embassy, and in particular they have taken special note of the tenor of the Secretary of State’s communication to the Japanese Ambassador on September 8th [7th]. They are naturally anxious to take into account any considerations which the United States may think it right to raise.
Having regard to the grave situation with which they are now confronted in Europe, it is of the utmost importance for His Majesty’s Government to consider how to avoid unnecessary friction in other parts of the world. If therefore His Majesty’s Government were to view the matter solely in the lights of their own interests they would be disposed to inform the Japanese Government that, as is only natural, the question of the employment of the British forces elsewhere has for some time been under consideration; that it was very probable that it would be decided to withdraw the British garrison, at all events from Tientsin, in the near future; that the Japanese Government would be notified as soon as a final decision had been reached, and that in the meantime His Majesty’s Government had taken note of the offer which the Japanese Government had made regarding the protection of British lives and property if and when the British forces were withdrawn.
If however the United States Government were disposed to adopt an attitude which, while primarily designed to safeguard United States interests in the Far East and to support the general policy of the United States towards China, would at the same time contribute to the common interests of our Governments, and if the United States Government felt that the withdrawal of the British garrisons would weaken the position which they wish to take up, then His [Page 257] Majesty’s Government would gladly reconsider the question in that light. But if His Majesty’s Government are to proceed to such reconsideration of the problem they can only do so when they are in possession of the United States Government’s views and have been informed of any concrete suggestions which the United States Government may have in mind as to the manner in which they themselves would propose that this firmer attitude should be maintained.
It is appreciated that the United States Government may well feel unable to formulate their views in this manner. On the other hand it must frankly be admitted that, while their general policy towards hostilities in the Far East remains unchanged, His Majesty’s Government do not feel themselves able at present, with their existing resources, and in face of their present commitments to offer any resistance that could be counted on to defeat persistent Japanese pressure. This pressure may at any time increase and in existing circumstances His Majesty’s Government feel that without some definite assurance of United States support it may well be better for them to withdraw without sacrifice of principle.
A further consideration to be borne in mind is that the question of the withdrawal from Tientsin may be raised in a new shape for practical reasons in view of the flooding of the Concession and the consequent necessity of rebuilding in the future. These considerations might necessitate withdrawal in any case and His Majesty’s Government feel that it might be that the general situation would be eased if it were possible to make a virtue of what may indeed be a necessity. A decision to withdraw their troops would in the view of His Majesty’s Government involve less of a blow to Western prestige in the Far East than that which would be inflicted were the troops compelled by force to submit to surrender and internment.
Meanwhile His Majesty’s Government feel that the situation does not admit of indefinite delay and unless the United States Government feel able to put forward some concrete suggestions as indicated above, His Majesty’s Government may have to consider the issue of early instructions for the withdrawal of His Majesty’s garrison from North China.
If and when such instructions were issued it would be made clear to the Japanese Government that the removal of the British troops was undertaken on military grounds and should be regarded as temporary and in no way prejudicing the rights enjoyed by His Majesty’s Government under the Treaty of Tientsin44 and the Boxer Protocol.
The United States Government would of course be notified in advance of any decision by His Majesty’s Government.
- Signed June 26, 1858, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. xlviii, p. 47.↩