893.0146/69a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Dooman)36
290. Department’s 277, September 7, 7 p.m. On September 15 the Japanese Ambassador called at his own request37 and stated that his Government had instructed him to elaborate upon what he had said to me last week.38 He prefaced his statement by indicating that he wished to include in his discussion the armed forces of the powers at Tientsin and Peiping as well as at Shanghai. I interrupted to say that while our conversation last week related primarily to the situation in the International Settlement at Shanghai I had in mind also the Tientsin and Peiping situations but assumed that no special discussion of the situations at Tientsin and Peiping was necessary for the reason that the rights of all foreign governments in respect to the stationing of armed forces there were fixed by the Boxer Protocol.
The Ambassador went on to say that Japan was desirous of remaining neutral in the European war and that Japan’s demarche to the British and French to withdraw their troops would tend to remove complications and possible clashes as, for example, between British and French troops on the one hand and Italian troops at Shanghai should Italy enter the war or between British troops and German nationals at Shanghai. The Ambassador added that his Government had no idea of inviting the American armed forces to withdraw from Shanghai. He indicated also that the Japanese and American Governments might be in key positions to promote peace should psychological occasion present itself.
I pointed out to the Ambassador that the primary functions of the armed forces of the powers at Tientsin and Peiping and in the International Settlement at Shanghai were that of guards as a protection against uncontrolled irresponsible forces with which the regular police could not cope and that consequently the Japanese Government was not warranted in proposing the withdrawal of the British and French armed forces on the theory that they were forces with primarily military functions. I asked that his Government keep in mind that questions pertaining to these forces have no important direct relationship with whatever plan Japan now has in China. I reemphasized the view of this Government that for the Japanese to force the British and French forces out of Shanghai would disrupt the whole structure of the administration of the International Settlement, would seriously [Page 253] affect the rights and interests of Americans there, and would lend color to reports already prevalent that Japan’s purpose is to sweep all foreigners out of China. I pointed out also that the feeling created among the American people against Japan would result in losses to Japan outweighing any trivial advantage gained by Japan from the action under reference, if taken.
When the Ambassador said that his Government would expect to confer with this Government in regard to questions relating to the policing of the International Settlement at Shanghai I made no comment. I added, however, that, taking the genesis of the entire situation there and considering all of its phases up to the present, my Government could not bring out its guards on the basis of an unwarranted suggestion or threat by another government. The Ambassador made no comment on this. He left with a promise that he would take up the matters further as I had requested.
You are authorized in your discretion to inform your British and French colleagues orally and in confidence of the foregoing.
- Similar telegrams were sent to the Embassies at London and Paris for the British and French Foreign Offices and to the Consul General at Shanghai.↩
- See memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 15, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 15.↩
- See memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 7, ibid., p. 12.↩