Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East, Volume III

740.0011 European War, 1939/164: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Chungking, September 6, 1939—10 a.m.
[Received September 7—4:30 a.m.]

520. My 519, September 6, 9 a.m.

1. The following comment based on conversation with informed Chinese officials and on the local press throws an interesting light on views expressed by Chiang Kai Shek reported recently to the Department:

2. Official and press reaction here to recent European developments does not appear to have crystallized along definite lines though it is apparent that the outbreak of hostilities is genuinely deplored and that responsibility for the catastrophe is attributed to Hitler. The majority of enlightened Chinese would have preferred to see peace kept in Europe as this was considered to be in the interests of China and now that war has come there is of course much speculation concerning its effect on China and Japan and on the war in the Far East. The question of future world political alignment is receiving serious consideration and in this connection it may be said that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is regarded as having isolated Japan and appears to have neutralized somewhat the adverse effects expected from the outbreak of hostilities and the assumed inability of Britain and France to protect their interests in the Far East. The following phases of the situation are being discussed in Chinese official circles:

3. England and France: There is widespread apprehension that Great Britain and France are endeavoring to arrive at a compromise with Japan, at the expense of China, in order to safeguard their interests in East Asia. Authoritative Chinese circles profess to have information that the Japanese Foreign Office has already sent instructions to Japanese consular establishments in China to desist from the anti-British campaign but that this abrupt change in policy has failed to date because of the refusal of the Japanese military authorities to conform thereto. British and French measures looking to cooperation with the Japanese in the occupied areas and prohibition of the shipment of arms through French Indo-China and Burma to China are thought to be possible and if carried out would affect China’s capacity to continue effective resistance.

4. Russia: Chinese official circles appear convinced that the Soviet Union will continue its policy of affording substantial material support to China; there is reason to believe that Russia has given China positive assurances to this effect. Moreover it is felt that Russia will continue to take measures on the Siberian and Mongolian borders designed to require the presence of large numbers of Japanese troops in Manchuria although without any intention to start large scale operations. In a word Russian policy is thought to envisage protection of its borders and those of Outer Mongolia and simultaneously assistance to China in carrying on the conflict with Japan. The cooperative characteristic of present day Sino-Russian relations appears to be amply evidenced not only by the steady support given by Russia to China but by the sudden action of Russia following the negotiation of the Soviet-German pact in appointing an erstwhile Trade Commissioner as Ambassador to China and by the reported action of China in accepting the appointment of the new Russian Ambassador without requiring the usual letter of credence.

5. United States: Chinese opinion appears to place the greatest trust and confidence in the Far Eastern policy of the United States though much disappointment and perturbation exist at what is regarded as the overly slow and cautious attitude and actions of the United States. Most Chinese feel that there can be no real solution of the Far Eastern problem without intervention of the United States in defense of the concepts of the treaties, and that such action on the part of the United States would soon force Japan to abandon its present attempt to obtain the hegemony of East Asia. While few Chinese feel that the United States should or need become embroiled in armed conflict with Japan, they believe that the United States should sever trade relations with Japan or at least stop shipments to that country.

6. Japan: Chinese observers are of the opinion that apart from endeavoring to mitigate the effects of the German-Russian non-aggression pact as related under paragraph 3 above the new Japanese Cabinet will adhere to the policy of recent Cabinets in respect of China. They believe that there will be an intensification of Japanese efforts to obtain economic control of the French-British areas as exemplified by the recent order for the collection of [revenue?] at Shanghai in Huahsing currency and the scheme for a central puppet regime under Wang Ching Wei and that a final supreme military effort will be made to [apparent omission] organized Chinese military intentions. The threat of Japanese financial and currency measures appears to cause the most apprehension among the three measures outlined above; Wang Ching Wei’s activities are regarded as unlikely to succeed. The conviction is expressed in Chinese military circles that the Chinese Army is fully capable of coping with any Japanese attempt to advance into West China.

It is stated that China has approximately 1 year’s supply of war materials and is almost self-sufficient in respect of small arms upon which it largely relies in the [guerilla?] type of warfare being conducted today.

In summary then Chinese opinion does not feel that the opening of general hostilities in Europe will exert any immediate or profound influence on the trend of developments in the Far East but certain secondary possibilities are causing anxiety as potentially prejudicial to China’s success in the hostilities.

Repeated to Peiping, Peiping please mail to Tokyo.

Johnson