793.94/15332: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:25 p.m.]
515. At the request of General Chiang I called upon him yesterday afternoon accompanied by Peck. The President of the Executive Yuan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Madame Chiang were present. What follows is a condensation of a series of carefully formulated and numbered observations made by Chiang and interpreted partly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and partly by Madame Chiang.
2. (1st) Chiang said he was anxious to learn the opinion of the President and also of the American people regarding the meaning and effect of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact particularly with reference to its bearing on future developments in the Far East.
(2d) He asserted that he had completely reliable information that the British and Japanese Governments were negotiating to revive the Anglo-Japanese alliance and to invite the [adherence?] thereto of the French Government. He would be very interested to learn whether the American Government had received this information.
(3d) He also had received information that during the discussions between the Soviet, British, and French Governments for a military accord the Soviet Government had proposed that its scope be extended [Page 218] to the Orient and that when the British and French rejected this proposal that government had determined to conclude the nonaggression pact with Germany in order to withdraw from European involvement and thus be able to devote its attention exclusively to the solution of Far Eastern problems. This solution it hopes to achieve in conjunction with the American, British, and French Governments but since in existing circumstances the latter two governments regarded the Soviet Government with a degree of suspicion the Soviet Government is hopeful that the American Government will take the initiative.
(4th) Chiang asked that I convey to the President his earnest desire that the American Government take the initiative by warning the British and French Governments against attempting to obtain Japanese protection for their Far Eastern interests by means of a revival of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He urged that the President as a substitute measure convoke an international conference to discuss Far Eastern problems either in continuance of the Washington Conference or of the Brussels Conference but in any case with the necessary addition of the Soviet Union. A revival of the Alliance would mean the elimination of the principles embodied in the Nine Power Treaty whose principal sponsor is the United States.
3. In making the foregoing observations Chiang’s delivery had been marked by more than his usual gravity and seriousness but in what he called three supplementary remarks he spoke with an almost passionate vehemence. These remarks were (a) China’s international policy is one of complete independence and is free from obligation to follow the dictates of the Soviet or of any other [power?]. (b) Chiang believes, however, that in the present international situation there can be no solution of the problems of the Far East except through the agency of the United States upon whose friendship and justice China depends. It is therefore urgently important that he learn at the earliest possible moment what policy the United States intends to adopt in the face of impending developments so that he may suitably frame China’s policy, (c) If Great Britain and France are acting on the supposition that Japan’s strength in the Orient is greater than that of China they are completely mistaken. If in placing their reliance on Japan they hope to remove a threat to their Far Eastern colonial possessions they should be warned to desist [omission?] have in view because China can be as grave a threat as Japan to the security of those possessions. Chiang will resist Great Britain and France [if they?] become allies of Japan in exactly the same way as he is resisting Japan. Chiang assured me that his information was positive that the revival of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a tripartite instrument might be decided upon at any moment and he urged that I lose no time in telegraphing to the Secretary and the President observations he had made and that I promptly inform him of the reply. This I promised to do.
[Page 219]4. After the interview the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me privately that while they could not tell me the source of their information regarding the discussions for the revival of the alliance he could assure me that it was a reliable one and that the Chinese Government overtly asked what its reaction would be to such a revival.
5. Chiang is clearly convinced that a difference in Chinese foreign policy and in the Far Eastern situation has been precipitated by the Russo-German non-aggression agreement and its effect upon British policy in the Far East. All along he has based hope of success in Chinese defense against Japanese encroachment on the conviction that sooner or later world opinion would change in such a way as to favor China and defeat Japan. Now [he] fears that Russia’s action in entering into a non-aggression pact with Germany will have so changed liberal opinion in England as to open the way for more conservative elements, who from the beginning have favored such a course, to press for an agreement of mutual assistance between England or [sic] against Russia if not a return to the Anglo-Japanese collaboration and for a repudiation by Great Britain of the Nine Power Treaty and the whole Far Eastern establishment as evolved at the Washington Conference. (This theory implies that just as conservative England has sympathized with and aided Germany in tearing up the Versailles settlement, so will conservative England sympathize with and aid Japan in her avowed policy of tearing up the Washington Conference settlement.) Responding to a direct question from the Generalissimo as to my personal reaction to what he had said in this regard, I said that I found it difficult to believe that England could go so far in restoring her relations with Japan not only because of opposition from Australia and Canada but also because I believe that England is relying rather heavily upon American sympathy and aid in her difficulties with Germany and doubtless was aware that such a step accompanied by an effort to persuade Chinese compliance with Japanese plans would be the quickest way of cooling pro-British sentiment in the United States. But my feelings in this regard were somewhat upset last evening upon my return by remarks made to me and to members of my staff by the local British Vice Consul who asked me what I considered to be the minimum peace terms which the Chinese would accept and by his apparent acceptance of the idea that the relations between England and Japan approaching an [apparent omission]. I said that I still believed that Chinese peace terms, at least such as might be framed by the Chinese Government, would call for the complete evacuation of Japanese soldiers and that I felt that the Chinese were worried over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. (I also recall that constantly during the past 2 years the [Page 220] British Government has been periodically sounding the Chinese Government on peace terms, has shown a desire to conciliate and perhaps by helping them to get control of Chinese customs and by acting the role of mediator between the Japanese and the Chinese.) The Vice Consul in question mentioned the fear in England that Russia might make common cause with Japan and then attack England through the allied forces (an unparalleled return to British fear of Russia which characterized the period of the nineties) and extreme reluctance of certain British leaders to have any negotiations with Russia. Later in conversation with a member of my staff he said that the British were concerned with the old fear that Japan and Russia might come to terms and he was of the opinion that the British Government would take steps to put the Tokyo pact into practice (presumably along the lines of Japanese interpretations) and take other effective measures to reach an agreement which might preclude any rapprochement between Japan and Russia. He said that he was immediately going to work on an evacuation plan for British subjects in his consular district for he believed that if his Government did take such steps as those above outlined and came to other arrangements with Japan it would result in reactions by the Chinese which would be detrimental to welfare of the British subjects in his district.
6. The astounding insistence by Chiang in his conversation with me that China and not Japan is the dominant military power in the Far East and capable of doing far more damage to British colonial possessions in the Far East than Japan may possibly be based upon a conviction that China would be working against Japan in conjunction with Russia. Although the fact is not officially admitted, a new Russian Ambassador is here waiting presentation of his credentials in a few days. For some reason the Russians have imposed secrecy as to his name.
7. During the conversation with Chiang [Wang] Doctor Hamilton said to me that China now relied upon America for something to save China as America had done in the past; he instanced our attitude in the Boxer negotiations89 and our refusal to join in punitive measures after the Nanking incident.90 He observed that the United States and China are the principal supports of peace in the Pacific and that by cooperating with China in the maintenance of peace the United States would protect its own welfare.
Repeated to Peiping, Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.