793.94119/571
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Reference, Paris’ telegram no. 1601, August 26, 9 a.m.
It seems to me altogether likely that Mr. Bullitt’s Polish colleague made this approach to Bullitt under instructions from the Polish Government.
Further, it is not unlikely that the Japanese Government initiated the approach.
Comment:
Removal of the American fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic would be very pleasing to Japan. It both would relieve the Japanese Army (operating in China) of certain anxieties and would be encouraging to the Japanese Navy (which wishes to operate southward). It would be demoralizing to the Chinese, discouraging to the British, and very helpful to any elements in Japan and in Russia that may be toying with the idea of working out an arrangement between those two countries toward division between them of spheres of operation in the Far East and on the continent of Asia.
Suggestions that we move our fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic have come from several sources during the past week. The various sources may all have been moved by suggestions originating in Japan.
I hope that Mr. Bullitt is correct in his “opinion that the American fleet would remain in the Pacific for some time to come.”
[Page 212]The moment has not yet arrived for any effort by the American Government, whether in association with the British and the French and/or other governments or by itself, to become involved in efforts “for the termination of war between Japan and China.” The Japanese Army is not ready to move out of China, and the Chinese are not ready to make a treaty whereby portions of that army would be authorized to stay in China. A treaty involving a “compromise” whereby Japan would be given various special concessions and privileges in north China would have to be forced upon China. Acceptance by China at this time of such a treaty, under pressure from third powers or a third power, would constitute a giving of assistance by such powers or power to Japan and would involve another Munich. While there might be some justification for efforts in that direction by the British and the French, for the purpose of salvaging something of what they have in China and strengthening their general position in the light of the menace which they face in Europe, there would be no justification for a move in that direction by the United States. In our foreign policy, we lay more emphasis upon moral and legal interests than upon material interests. Our great problem in relation to current developments in the Far East is that of defending principles rather than that of salvaging investments. We are not immediately menaced as regards territory, either overseas or at home. Our constant objectives and our immediate problems do not call for any sacrificing of principles on our part and would not warrant any betrayal of China by us.
If we ever step into a role of mediator between Japan and China, we should do so after and only on the basis of a direct invitation officially offered us by the Japanese and the Chinese Governments; and, we should think hard before associating ourselves with Great Britain and France and/or any other country in such a role.