740.00/2007: Telegram
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 3—10:45 a.m.]
384. Department’s 235, August 1, 8 p.m.
1. Before proceeding to clarify the point discussed in paragraph 1 of the Department’s telegram under reference I must correct a misunderstanding which I have inadvertently permitted the Department to form by failing to stress that it has been represented to me, and I believe correctly, that knowledge of the Prime Minister’s proposal with regard to an international conference is confined only to his entourage. (Please see last two sentences page 8 of despatch No. 3936, June 774). That the Foreign Minister has no knowledge of this project is strongly indicated by the fact that both he and the Vice Minister, hearing that I had been received by the Prime Minister, asked me on separate occasions what the Prime Minister had to say (I referred them to the Prime Minister). I believe that this fact will serve to explain my feeling that the Prime Minister’s personal and confidential move merits a reply separate from the official reply to his official message.
2. With regard to the point which I am desired to clarify, I am strongly impressed by the primary significance which is generally attached in Japan to the fact that notice of termination of the commercial treaty75 was given by the United States without prior intimation as there would have been had the action been motivated in large part by economic considerations. The deduction that the motivating considerations were political in character is confirmed by noting American press and other popular reaction to the notice of termination.
I find no dissent either in the press or among individual Japanese from the conclusion that the recent American action inaugurated a positive American attitude. There is, however, complete uncertainty as to the compass of issues which might cause the United States to give effect to that attitude by further decisive action and conversely silent on field within which American and Japanese policies can be respectively pursued without conflicting with each other. Every action and statement of Chinese attitude is now being microscopically examined in the hope of finding a clue towards solving these questions.
[Page 203]3. I realize that there are considerations leading to the action taken by our Government last week which fall entirely outside the field of my observation and which made necessary a step obviously falling within the realm of high policy. But I feel that before this correspondence is closed I should record my estimate of the effects which will be produced by delivery of the reply in the form decided upon by the Department. I believe that the reply would be interpreted (a) by the Japanese Government as an indication that the attitude now taken by the American Government requires the termination of the conflict with China as a condition precedent to the betterment by Japan of her relations with the United States; and (b) by the Prime Minister as a closing of the door to insure peace in the Far East.
- For extracts of despatch, see p. 43; the sentences referred to (not printed) stressed “the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk” with the Japanese Prime Minister, whose “political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.”↩
- For note to the Japanese Ambassador dated July 26, see p. 558; for treaty of February 21, 1911, see Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 315.↩