893.00/14411
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 5.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s telegram to the Department No. 174, dated March 13, 1939, 5.00 P.M.,68 regarding the “National Spiritual Mobilization” program, on the success of which General Chiang Kai Shek has said “the fate of the nation” depends, I have the honor to observe that to date efforts to put the program into effect on a national scale appear to have been negligible; that while the program has evoked a response among certain Chinese in the International Settlement at Shanghai, it seems to have aroused little interest among officials at Chungking; that there is reason to believe that one of the program’s objectives is to counteract Communist influence through “mobilization of the masses” under Kuomintang auspices; that the program may, if carried out along lines originally indicated, tend to foster nationalistic spirit, but that it is doubtful whether it will add greatly to the spirit of resistance inspired by the example of General Chiang, and by resentment against the Japanese aroused among people who have suffered at their hands.
[Here follow details of program.]
On the other hand, it is quite apparent that the success of the Communists, and of provincial leaders such as Marshal Yen Shih-shan in Shansi and Generals Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen in Kwangsi, in “mobilization of the masses” has not gone unnoticed by members of the Kuomintang, and the belief that one of the objectives of “National Spiritual Mobilization” is to make China safe for the Kuomintang is entirely plausible when one considers the emphasis placed on loyalty and obedience to the Kuomintang in the handbook previously referred to. The deep-seated antipathy to the Communists entertained by certain Kuomintang leaders lends further credence to this theory.
Opposition to, and distrust of the Communists found in Kuomintang circles is exemplified by remarks made to a member of my staff [Page 196] by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Central Executive Committee to the effect that the party would endeavor to make use of the Communists as long as hostilities lasted, but that no pains would be spared to prevent the Communists from gaining power sufficient to threaten the position of the Kuomintang—especially after the war; and that having been associated with Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders in Canton in 1925, he was convinced that their ultimate aim was to destroy the Kuomintang. The “spiritual mobilization” program thus offers a possible means of increasing the power of the Kuomintang in all areas not under the direct control of strong regional leaders, such as the Communists and Marshal Yen. In this connection, there is reason to believe that if both the Kuomintang and the Communists survive the present hostilities there is a prospect of a bitter struggle between the two groups for control of post-war China.
That there is serious friction between National Government authorities and Communists in Shansi is clearly indicated by American observers returning from that region—one of whom was there barely a month ago. For the time being, however, the Kuomintang is making no attempt to force its “spiritual mobilization” program on either the Communists or Marshal Yen’s followers. Thus in Shansi and Shensi “spiritual mobilization” is carried on without benefit of the Kuomintang.
The most useful purpose of the program in its present stage of development appears to be to dramatize and explain in language easily understood, through the medium of the “National Pact”, the things which a patriotic Chinese should not do. If the oath is taken seriously by all Chinese in unoccupied areas, and by as many as can be reached in the occupied areas, it may tend to counteract the effects of war-weariness and apathy which are bound to undermine morale if the “Second Period of Resistance” lasts too long. It is too early, however, to judge the extent to which the “National Pact” is influencing the masses.
In the light of the foregoing considerations it is difficult to believe that the “National Spiritual Mobilization” program has, since its inception, had any material effect on the prosecution of the war, or that it is, in its present form, likely to have any profound influence on the outcome of hostilities. Partisan politics, lack of effective means of propaganda, the individualistic natures of government officials and of the man in the street—all constitute obstacles not easily overcome under present conditions.
It must not be forgotten, however, that “spiritual mobilization” of a really effective sort is inspired by the leadership of General Chiang, and by the resentment against the Japanese aroused among people [Page 197] who have suffered as a direct result of the invasion of China. The Chinese who are resisting the Japanese invasion—either by force of arms or through obstructionist tactics at which they are so adept, realize that resistance is costly and painful, but appear convinced that living under Japanese rule would be even more painful. Whether the “National Spiritual Mobilization” program under discussion succeeds or not—as a propaganda campaign—there is no reason to believe that the spirit of resistance growing out of resentment against the Japanese and their methods will not continue to constitute the most potent of all the forces now operating to create a strong national spirit in China.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩