793.94119/557

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)53

The Japanese Prime Minister’s message to the Secretary, transmitted through the Foreign Office and contained in Tokyo’s no. 234, May 18, 5 p.m.,54 in essence advances the thesis that conditions making for true world peace can only be obtained through assuring to nations their “proper places in the world”, and it is a scarcely disguised plea that the political thinking of this Government with regard to the so-called “have not” nations be revised.

Tokyo’s 245, May 26, 8 p.m.,55 reveals a growing concern on the part of Japan as to its future security. This concern appears to be inspired by (1) Anglo-Soviet negotiations on the subject of a military arrangement, (2) lack of confidence in the stability and military effectiveness against the democracies of the anti-Comintern powers, (3) doubt whether Japan could maintain its neutrality in the event of a European war, and (4) the prospect of the United States becoming involved in a European war and the consequent likelihood of the United States and Japan being drawn into opposite camps. Certain influential Japanese are therefore convinced that Japan should not tie itself up too closely with the anti-Comintern powers and should try to improve Japanese relations with the democratic powers, and to this end it is even suggested that Japan might eventually and under certain conditions moderate its peace terms to be offered to China.

Tokyo’s 242 of May 23, 11 p.m., discusses from another angle a possible future course of action by Japan to establish its future security. The Japanese Prime Minister has indicated that the Japanese [Page 182] people feel that Great Britain and the United States were complacent when China began to whittle down the fruits of Japan’s victory over Russia, that the only thanks Japan got for its cooperation in the World War was the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and that the Washington and London naval treaties and the Nine Power Pact completely tied Japan’s hands. So strong is the sense of grievance of the Japanese people over those developments that the Japanese Government believes it can make no peace with China which does not assure Japan’s economic security and that under existing world conditions such security cannot be provided by restoration of the status quo ante. The Prime Minister indicated, however, that he has come to the conclusion that it would be impossible to dissociate the Far Eastern problem from the conditions of unrest in Europe and elsewhere and that this problem is capable of solution by negotiation only when the conditions which lie at the root of the European problem as well as of the Far Eastern problem can be considered. He said that if the powers could come together to find by negotiation a solution of the world’s troubles those issues involving American rights in China could be disposed of without difficulty. He said also that he was prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a conference of the powers for the consideration of European as well as Far Eastern problems, if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out Great Britain and France.

The statement of the Japanese Premier that Japan’s first preoccupation must be the success of Japan’s military operations reveals how essential the Japanese regard the upholding of the tradition of the invincibility of Japanese arms from the point of view of the national prestige and the prestige of the Japanese army at home. In other words, Japan will endeavor to insist that any peace to be concluded with China must be on the basis of the assumption, if not the actuality, of Japanese military victory. While it is not to be supposed that Japanese leaders contemplate the possibility of military defeat at the hands of the Chinese, it is believed that the lack of progress in their continental program, in the success of which their prestige is also involved, and the possibility of the eventual collapse of that program as a result of the steady deterioration of the national strength from the prolonged hostilities, are giving Japanese leaders no little concern. It may therefore be in the minds of the Japanese that a possible way out for them from the present apparent impasse might be offered if there could be convened a world conference such as the Japanese Prime Minister has suggested for the purpose of considering means of promoting world peace through appeasement and satisfaction of the claims of the “have not” powers.

The Astoria visit has undoubtedly raised hopes in Japan that the United States might be willing to be of service in the matter of such [Page 183] a conference. Should such a conference be called by, for example, the United States, the Japanese might then adopt a formula to the effect that out of deference to the United States and out of their sincere desire for world peace they would be willing to participate in the conference and contribute to its success even at the sacrifice of their real interests. On such a basis they might be able to justify to the Japanese public a withdrawal from or modification of their announced program in China. They would expect, however, to bring to such a conference various claims designed to promote their political and military security and meet their economic needs.

The Government of the United States would, of course, wish to contribute in every appropriate way to the cause of world peace. While FE56 is not competent to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such a world conference in relation to the situation in Europe and of our interests involved in that situation, there occur to mind from the point of view of the situation in the Far East and the interests of the United States in the Far East certain objections to an initiative being taken by this Government at this time in calling such a world conference. These objections are as follows:

1.
The taking of the initiative by the United States would place Japan in a better position for bargaining than if Japan should become forced by circumstances to take the initiative in the matter of the negotiation of a peace settlement.
2.
As already indicated, such action by the United States might provide a means of escape for Japanese militarism and enable it to emerge from the conflict with its prestige comparatively unimpaired, whereas if matters take their natural course there might be a better chance that the Japanese military clique would eventually so suffer in prestige as to weaken its position in the Japanese Government.
3.
The compromises which would undoubtedly be involved in any peace settlement would probably leave both the Japanese and the Chinese people dissatisfied with the settlement reached and consequently the United States would be likely to become the object of the ill will of both the Japanese and the Chinese people.
4.
Any general program for the solution of the conditions of unrest throughout the world such as is envisaged by the Japanese Prime Minister would probably involve questions of concessions by the “have” powers. There is, therefore, inherent in such a program the question of how far the United States could go in offering Japan concessions which might satisfy Japan and induce it to abandon its present policies. Although Japan is of course primarily concerned with desiderata in Asia the Japanese might adopt a more conciliatory attitude in return for the removal of the discriminatory features in our immigration laws or for tariff concessions. However, it cannot be [Page 184] anticipated that Congress would be likely to abandon in principle Asiatic exclusion even if such abandonment did not mean a modification in practice of our present immigration policy. With regard to tariff concessions, not only would suggestions of possible action by this country undoubtedly give rise to protests from the affected American industries but it would also be doubtful whether, so long as the Japanese continue to pursue the closed economy now being practiced in Japan, there is room for a reciprocal trade agreement with Japan except on a one-sided basis operating in favor of Japan. Perhaps the only thing we could offer Japan of an important practical value would be an undertaking that this Government would interpose no objection to long-term loans and credits to Japan by American bankers and exporters, contingent, of course, upon the conclusion by Japan of a settlement with China voluntarily entered into by the National Government of China and considerate of America interests. It might be possible even for the Government of the United States under such conditions to grant credits to Japan for the purchase of American cotton and other agricultural products which would be of material help in the economic rehabilitation of Japan and at the same time benefit our agricultural interests.
5.
Action by the United States might be premature from the point of view of effecting a peace settlement of a lasting character. It is difficult to conceive of any peace settlement being acceptable to Japan at the present time which would not leave Japan in military control of the five northern provinces of China. Even assuming that Chiang Kai-shek would be willing to conclude a peace on such a basis, it is doubtful whether he could control unreconciled Chinese elements and make them abide by such a peace settlement. Those elements would thus be likely to commit acts disruptive of peace in the border territories, thus producing a repetition of the same vicious circle of conditions which created a chronic turmoil in Sino-Japanese relations in the years following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. Consequently, such a settlement would be likely to prove to be no more than a temporary respite from hostilities which would be resumed after the opposing forces had had a breathing spell. With large areas of China remaining under Japanese occupation, it is doubtful whether a temporary respite from hostilities would be as advantageous to China as to Japan.

For the time being it would seem that there is no action which this Government might usefully take in regard to the subject other than to continue to indicate to the Japanese when they bring up the subject, as Mr. Grew already appears to have done, that, until the Japanese Government is prepared to give evidence of an intention to make peace with China on terms which the Chinese Government could accept and which would be considerate of the rights and interests of [Page 185] the United States and other countries, this Government would be unable to give favorable consideration to Japanese suggestions for discussions between the Japanese and American Governments on the subject. It is believed that the manifestation of such an attitude on our part would not result in an opportunity being lost for useful contribution by this Government to the cause of peace in the Far East.

On the other hand, it should be recognized that there are arguments in favor of initiative by the United States directed toward bringing about peace negotiations, the principal ones being that it would tend to hasten peace (even though that peace might prove to be only a truce), and thereby incidentally remove the constant risk of our involvement in war in the Far East; that it would tend to avert a possible eventual complete collapse of China or Japan or of both; and that it might offer Japan the only alternative to the conclusion of a military alliance with the anti-Comintern powers. Granting the force of these arguments, it is believed, nevertheless, that objections to American initiative, at least for the present, far outweigh the arguments in favor thereof.

Note: It will be recalled that in connection with the approaches under discussion which have been made to Mr. Grew and to Mr. Dooman by the Japanese Prime Minister and by the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Japanese Prime Minister emphasized the fact that the approaches should be regarded as secret and highly confidential. According to information communicated in Mr. Dooman’s strictly confidential telegram 265, June 8, 7 p.m.,57 the Japanese Foreign Minister has apparently disclosed to the Polish Ambassador at Tokyo that the Japanese Government has taken steps to explore the views of the American Government with regard to the possibility that Japan and the United States might collaborate toward bringing about a détente in Europe.

  1. Notation by the Chief of the Division (Hamilton), who initialed the memorandum: “Shown to Mr. Hornbeck and to Mr. Grew.” The latter was on home leave from his post in Japan.
  2. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. ii, p. 1.
  3. Ante, p. 40.
  4. The Division of Far Eastern Affairs.
  5. Ante, p. 45.