793.94119/547
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to
the Secretary of State
Hong Kong, June 2,
1939.
[Received June 13.]
Sir: There is enclosed herewith a copy of a
memorandum prepared by Major McHugh of a conversation which he had with
the British Ambassador while in Shanghai recently. I have already
reported by telegraph to the Department the British Ambassador’s
invitation for myself and the American Commander-in-Chief to meet with
him the British Commander-in-Chief and the French Ambassador and the
French Commander-in-Chief in Shanghai, and my inability to comply with
his request and the reasons therefor. I have also reported to the
Department by radio from Shanghai52 of my subsequent conversation with the British Ambassador, in
the course of which he outlined the possible attitude of the
Generalissimo in regard to peace proposals. This subject is more
adequately covered by the memorandum of Major McHugh which is
enclosed.
During the day that I spent at Yokohama I had long talks with Mr. Dooman,
Consul General Cameron and Consul Boyce. Later in Kobe I had a long talk
with Consul Gourley and his staff. I saw no Japanese. Mr. Dooman
informed me of the farewell talks which Ambassador Grew had with the
Japanese Foreign Office. I carried away with me a conviction that the
Japanese government, while anxious to be on friendly terms with the
United States and while anxious to see an end to the military situation
in China, was by no means in a position to begin any negotiations with
the Chinese authorities on terms which might be acceptable to the
Chinese, nor was it prepared to accept any mediatory activities on our
part. I carried away also a distinct impression that our Embassy and
Consulates in Japan felt that Japan was not feeling any economic pinch
such as would drive them to a conclusion of military activities in China
to their disadvantage; that the military, at least, believed that Japan
could go on indefinitely along present lines, and believed that they
would be successful in the end. This conviction is quite at variance
with the information which the Generalissimo appears to have conveyed to
the British Ambassador, who appears to have sounded him out on the
question of peace. It is possible that when I arrive at Chungking and
see the Generalissimo he may bring this subject up in a conversation
with me, although I have no intention on my part to initiate a
discussion of the subject, for I am convinced that mediation, insofar as
the United States is concerned, would not be acceptable at this time. I
believe that the American Embassy and the other American representatives
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in Japan are convinced
that if the United States should impose economic restrictions against
Japan, such action on our part in the present state of Japanese feeling,
might very likely result in an effort on the part of Japan to counteract
such restrictions by forcibly seizing such resources as might be
available in the Far East, as for instance, the Dutch East Indies, in
order to make Japan independent. I am disposed to share that conviction
at the present time. I feel that the Japanese effort by military
measures to make a conquest of China is doomed in the end to failure,
but I am convinced that the Japanese army is not yet convinced of such
failure and that it is still determined to proceed with its program.
There is a danger to us and to the British in this attitude. I believe
that there is a good deal of war-weariness present among the Japanese
people today, that the peak of war fever has passed, and that there is
always the possibility that, reacting to the need of giving the Japanese
people something in the nature of a success, to justify continued
support of the army, and there being no further victories on land
possible, the Japanese military may, in desperation, be compelled to
seize the International Settlement at Shanghai. I understand that the
British Embassy and the British authorities in the Far East are
convinced that economic pressure upon Japan at the present moment would
bring about a collapse of the Japanese military effort in China and
compel the Japanese to seek a peace. It is my feeling that such economic
restrictions, while they might have this effect, might on the contrary
have the effect of compelling the Japanese to make an effort to give
themselves independence of our economic power through seizure of
resources such as the Dutch East Indies. But, in any case, intervention
on our part at this time to bring about cessation of hostilities, if
successful, would leave the Japanese military unconvinced of the
ultimate success of their effort and would merely leave a situation not
unlike that which existed in Germany, which would have to be taken care
of sooner or later when the Japanese had prepared themselves for a
further effort. I feel that we should continue to watch the situation;
deal with it as it develops, in the hope that sooner or later the
Japanese military may, of their own accord, become convinced of the
futility of going on. At such a time as this may occur it may perhaps be
possible for us to exercise some good offices, but even then we should
have to act with caution because I am convinced that the animosity which
has been bred among the Chinese people by Japanese military activities
on the mainland will be such that no Chinese leader will be able to
control his own people and soldiers should the Japanese begin to weaken
their hold on any place which they now hold. Betirement of Japanese
forces would be accompanied by advance of Chinese and acts of hostility
against isolated Japanese and it would be extremely
[Page 176]
dangerous for anyone to enter the
situation for purposes of mediation with any idea that they could
guarantee a peaceful withdrawal or a peaceful advance by one side or the
other.
These are impressions which I have collected in the few days that I have
had since landing in Japan, during visits in Yokohama, Kobe, and
Shanghai. I have set them down in this despatch transmitting Major
McHugh’s memorandum in order that they may be sent at once to the
Department.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Assistant Naval Attaché in
China (McHugh)
- 1.
- I saw the British Ambassador for two hours on the afternoon of
May 30, 1939, when we resumed conversation on the general
situation in China and especially with reference to
possibilities for settling the present hostilities. Sir
Archibald, as usual, talked very frankly, reading to me from
time to time from despatches which he had sent to London and
reviewing what he had learned in Chungking since we had last
conversed there on May 5th, the day after the second bombing. He
had already at that time been up there two weeks and had seen
Chiang Kai-shek twice, going on each occasion on an informal
picnic with Madame Chiang and the Generalissimo to the hills
outside of the city in order to assure a quiet and uninterrupted
conversation.
- 2.
- Sir Archibald informed me that he had been on two more such
picnics since I had departed. On the first of these (the third
occasion) he had sounded out Chiang on the question of peace by
inquiring what Chiang could tell him to pass along to his people
as to the possibilities for a settlement of the present
Sino-Japanese hostilities. Chiang had turned the question back
upon him by asking him what he would do if he were in Chiang’s
place. Clark Kerr had replied by stating: (1) he would forget
about Manchuria for the present and concede that point to the
Japanese trusting to the grandsons of the present generation to
recover this lost territory; (2) hold out on Inner Mongolia and
refuse any special concessions there; (3) insist on economic
cooperation and not domination in North China; (4) insist on the
withdrawal of the Japanese army from China to a pre-war status,
but guarantee to the Japanese no anti-Japanese agitation.
- 3.
- I inquired at this point whether these points were not in
general those which had been previously proposed by the
so-called “moderate” group in Japan which we had previously
discussed in Chungking (reported by despatch through the
Embassy, Chungking). The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.
He then said that Chiang had replied that two things had to
happen before peace could be discussed
[Page 177]
now and that both of them depended upon
Great Britain and the U. S. A., namely, economic retaliation
against Japan to force her to abandon her program in China,
followed by an offer of mediation to settle the present conflict
along lines which would guarantee China’s continued independence
and territorial integrity. I pointed out here: (1) that to date
I had heard nothing which indicated that any of the peace
proposals had the approval of the Japanese Army and that until
this occurred there was no point in discussing the question; and
(2) that any power who tried to mediate in the present war would
have to be prepared not only to force the Japanese Army to
retire, but also to hold the Chinese back. The Ambassador
replied with a surprising statement. He said that Chiang had
informed him that he had recently received definite information
that the Japanese Army were prepared to pull back their forces
to their 1937 pre-war positions as a preliminary move to peace
negotiations and that this move would be accomplished under the
cloak of an Imperial Order or Edict, but that some face-saving
gesture such as an offer of mediation by Great Britain and the
U. S. A. would be necessary first.
- 4.
- I expressed surprise and doubt at this and the Ambassador was
inclined to agree, but he said he had informed London when he
reported this that although Chiang Kai-shek’s information in the
past may not have been 100% correct in all instances, it had
always had a measure of truth in it. Clark Kerr then said he had
inquired of Chiang if the latter felt that he could hold back
his troops in the event the Japanese started a withdrawal and
restrain them from stampeding after the Japanese, creating a
time lag of four or five days in the reoccupation of towns
evacuated by the Japanese. Chiang replied that he felt he could
do this.
- 5.
- I then inquired what Chiang’s reaction had been to the four
point peace program which he had suggested. The Ambassador
replied that the points did not suit Chiang but that Chiang had
said he would rather not say at the time what he would be
prepared to accept. Clark Kerr had inferred that Chiang hoped to
concede less, but was not sure he would be able to achieve this.
The Ambassador emphasized however that he had found Chiang still
very confident of his ability to carry on the war until the
Japanese had to sue for peace. His attitude was by no means that
of a man who was seeking a way out. In this connection the
Ambassador referred to his first conversation with Chiang at
Chungking when the question of the so-called April
“counter-offensive” had come up. Chiang had corrected him
immediately on the use of the term and had explained that his
purpose was merely to keep things stirred up on all fronts so
that the Japanese could not concentrate their forces at any one
point. Chiang had said that if the Japanese could concentrate
they obviously could still break
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through and capture places. He did not
want the people to build up false hopes only to have them dashed
by such an event. He felt that by keeping all fronts active he
could eventually wear the Japanese out.
- 6.
- The Ambassador then read to me two telegrams he had sent to
London in which he had reported his general impressions gained
on his recent trip to Chungking. He said he had found the
atmosphere more encouraging than during his previous visit; the
soldiers now being recruited to be of better quality and with a
marked improvement in discipline; and the spirit of the people
unaffected by the bombings of Chungking. He stated that the
latter had demonstrated that the question formerly put by many
people as to the effect of bombing on the morale of the
Szechuanese and their attitude toward the Central Government had
been answered and that Szechuan would definitely go along with
the Government. He found some tendency on the part of
individuals to criticize the machinery of the Government and its
methods, but no one to oppose the continuance of resistance to
Japanese aggression. There was also criticism of the general
purpose of the Kuomintang as being pointed more toward its self
preservation than toward the welfare of the country as a whole,
but stated that both Chu Chia-hua (the Secretary General of the
Party) and Chou En-lai (Eighth Route Army Representative) had
separately informed him during long conversations that all
parties were pulling together at the top and that there was no
doubt of continued unity among the leaders.
- 7.
- The Ambassador reported that he found complete public
confidence in Chiang Kai-shek and the resistance to be more and
more of a one man show. He stated his belief that even were
Chiang to die suddenly, the resistance would go on until some
other leader emerged to coordinate it again utilizing the spirit
of Chiang as a symbolic force. The Ambassador stated that he
believed the supply of small arms ammunition on hand not only to
be adequate for some time to come but that he had reason to
believe that the Chinese now had arsenals working which made
them independent on this score. He also believed that the new
routes of communication being opened up would be sufficient to
maintain morale and keep up a fair supply of essentials from
outside. He complimented the work of the Ministries of
Communications and Economics, but found the Ministry of Finance
still “sadly lacking” and “inefficient”. I found myself in
general agreement with all that he had reported.
- 8.
- The Ambassador then told me in strict confidence that there
had been a separate peace offer made to Chiang just prior to his
recent trip to Chungking. It appears that Sir Robert Calder
Marshall of Shanghai had come to Clark Kerr just prior to the
latter’s departure and had inquired what the Ambassador’s
reaction would be to any effort on Calder Marshall’s part to
promote peace talks. Clark Kerr
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had told him to go ahead by all means.
Calder Marshall then stated that Dr. Alfred Sze had been in
touch with Mr. Kodama (former head of the Yokohama Specie Bank
and recently placed in charge of the new Hua Hsing Bank that has
been organized at Shanghai). The proposal which Kodama had made
to Sze was that the Japanese Army was prepared to withdraw from
all areas in China except for garrisons at the principal treaty
ports, including Hankow. Other conditions if any were not
named.
- 9.
- This proposal was sent to T. V. Soong in Hong Kong and relayed
by him to Chiang Kai-shek who flatly rejected it. When his reply
reached the negotiators in Shanghai word was immediately sent
back to ask Chiang not to close the door on this avenue of
negotiation as “easier terms could be obtained”. Clark Kerr told
me that he had cautiously broached this subject at Chungking
with Chiang and had been told that no proposals involving the
garrisoning of China by the Japanese Army would be considered.
It was this, in fact, which lead to the discussions related
earlier in this memorandum.
Respectfully submitted,
J. M. McHugh
Major, U. S. M. C.
