793.94/15020
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State32
In the absence of any statement by the Chinese or the Japanese Governments of the reasons why those Governments respectively have not declared war in connection with the current China “incident”, any statement which may be made by anyone in answer to the question, “Why have China and/or Japan not declared war?”, can at best be only a statement of opinion. Such a statement, moreover, involves an exercise of judgment by its maker with regard to the animation and the motivation of the decisions and acts of human beings other than himself, and therefore involves excursion into a speculative field.
It is believed that no one and single cause can safely be attributed. As a broad generality, it may perhaps safely be suggested that each government has refrained from declaring war on the theory that by so doing it is best serving its country’s interest.
The question arises: Why should China have declared war? China did not launch hostilities against Japan; the hostilities were begun by Japanese armed forces, in China, and they have been carried on by Japanese armed forces, against China, in China. As between Japan and China, if it were to be expected that either country would declare war, it would naturally be expected that the first declaration would be made by the Japanese. (Note: It appears that in the case of Italian-Ethiopian hostilities neither country declared war. At the end, however, of the hostilities, the Italian Government described what had taken place as having been “war”. In the Japanese-Chinese case, the Japanese have officially and persistently designated what is going on as the “China incident”.)
Had there been or were there to be a declaration of war either by Japan or by China, that part of the general body of international law which is known as the Law of War would immediately come into operation. This would immediately alter the general legal situation by making the parties to the conflict subject to the laws of belligerency and making the other nations (those which might elect to remain neutrals) [Page 154] subject to the laws of neutrality. It would seem that both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments have preferred thus far that this alteration of the situation not be brought about. Viewed from a distance, it would seem that, were that alteration brought about, the advantages flowing therefrom to Japan, a naval power, would be greater than the advantages to China, in so far as the conflict between those two countries is immediately involved. That consideration alone would perhaps account for China’s not having chosen to declare war. (Note: At the same time, it would seem that from point of view of Japan’s relations with other powers, there might arise, if the Law of War went into effect, disadvantages to Japan outweighing the possible advantages; and there is warrant for a hypothesis that this possibility may have been of considerable weight among the factors which have caused Japan to refrain from declaring war.)
As suggested above, more considerations than one enter into the making of such a decision. Among the many facts and factors which doubtless have been considered by the Chinese and the Japanese Governments mention may be made of the fact that there is in existence in the United States “neutrality” legislation. Had either the Chinese or the Japanese Government declared war, the President of the United States presumably would have felt obliged to issue the proclamation provided for in the Neutrality Act, and a series of effects would have followed. There is much difference of opinion on the subject of advantages and disadvantages which would accrue to China and to Japan respectively from the going into operation of the provisions of the United States neutrality legislation. It is problematical which of the two countries would gain more and which would lose more were that legislation put into “operation”. However, the Chinese, generally speaking, that is, both Chinese officialdom and the Chinese public, have clearly been of the opinion that China would be more adversely affected than would Japan. The Chinese, therefore, have not desired that the said legislation come into “operation”. That fact would be a factor among the various factors which would contribute to the disinclination of the Chinese Government to declare war. In Japan, it would appear, there has not been the unanimity of opinion that has been discernible in China on the subject of relative advantages and disadvantages which would flow from the coming into “operation” of the United States neutrality legislation. As a factor, among the many which have entered into the determining of their position on the subject of declaring war, the existence of the United States legislation has probably been of less weight in the case of Japan than in the case of China. Nevertheless, it may be that responsible and thoughtful Japanese officialdom has attached a good deal of importance to the question: What indirect and once removed consequences, [Page 155] in the field of further evolution of American public opinion and of action by the United States which might flow therefrom, might develop were a possible new sequence of events to be initiated by the coming into operation of the United States neutrality legislation? How much an apprehensive foresight may have influenced their thought, it is impossible to estimate.
It must be remembered that China and Japan have been in different positions because of and in regard to certain treaty obligations. China is a member of the League of Nations and Japan no longer is a member. The Chinese feel that provisions of the Nine Power Treaty are advantageous to China and the Japanese feel that provisions of that treaty are disadvantageous to Japan. In those contexts and settings, the Chinese would probably feel themselves more inhibited against declaring war than would the Japanese. However, both countries are signatories of the Pact of Paris, and from point of view of the declaration and pledge contained in that pact, each country would presumably be reluctant to declare war.
- In response to an inquiry from the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Bloom) as to why neither China nor Japan had declared war, the unsigned memorandum was prepared in the Department for informal and unofficial communication to Mr. Bloom.↩