740.00111A Combat Areas/51
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)
Following a conversation with Sir Owen Chalkley and several of his associates yesterday afternoon on navicerts, I had a brief conversation with Mr. Foster of the British Embassy concerning the question of American vessels and British contraband stations. I recalled to Mr. Foster that when Mr. Moffat and I discussed this question with Hoyer Millar and himself it was largely a hypothetical question but that it had now become a very definite actuality; that I had just learned today that the Moore–McCormack vessel Mormactide would sail for Bergen on November 11th or 12th, and that in approximately ten or twelve days the authorities of his Government would face an actual test case.
I stated at the outset that the provisions of the Neutrality Act on the subject are unmistakable, and that the Mormactide could not proceed to Kirkwall without violating American law. I said that the Master of the vessel would certainly, if “invited” to proceed to Kirkwall by a blockade officer, “respectfully decline” the invitation; and that if the vessel went to Kirkwall it would be because the British naval authorities actually forced the vessel to proceed there. This, I stated, we earnestly hoped the British would not do. I said that entirely aside from the question of the British Government’s assuming responsibility for any damage to the vessel or any delay caused, we hoped that they would find that as a practical matter it was not necessary to force American vessels to violate American law in this manner. I stated that it was my understanding that the Moore–McCormack Line had for some time been sending by air mail copies of their manifests to London in order to facilitate an examination of the ship’s papers by the British naval authorities. I added that I also understood that the Moore–McCormack Line had given an undertaking to the British Government to hold at Bergen on board their vessels, on the request of the British Consul, any cargo which the British authorities believed to be destined to Germany, and to return the cargo to the United States if these suspicions had not been removed by the time the vessel sailed. I added that in these circumstances it was difficult for us to see why the British Government might find it necessary to take these vessels into Kirkwall.
Mr. Foster at this point remarked that surely we would not contend that our Congress could unilaterally abridge the belligerent rights of Great Britain. I replied that we were making no such contention. I said that it seemed to me to be rather a coldly practical [Page 774] matter which the British Government might well decide to meet in a practical way. I said that I had not the slightest doubt that there would be some bitter press reactions in the United States if they compelled the Mormactide, in defiance of an Act of Congress, to proceed to Kirkwall. I said that it seemed to me that they might well wish to weigh the advantages and disadvantages and to consider whether there was enough actually to be gained from taking American vessels into the combat zone to offset the resulting unfavorable publicity in the United States, not to mention their increased liability should an American vessel entering or leaving Kirkwall be damaged.
Mr. Foster said that the Embassy had sent a telegram to London following the conversation which he and Mr. Hoyer Millar had had with Mr. Moffat and me, and that he would send a further telegram based on our talk. He said that he could not as yet give any indication of the decision of his Government, but that for his part he hoped some way could be found to avoid the necessity of taking American vessels into the combat zone by the blockade authorities.