800.8840/1407
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)
The Counselor of the Belgian Embassy, Baron de Gruben, called this morning. He said that he wished to discuss the question of maritime communication between the United States and Belgium.
Belgium, according to Baron de Gruben, was interested in seeing American ships continue in the carrying trade to Belgium for three reasons: (1) Because the Belgian merchant marine was insufficient to carry Belgian commerce; (2) because they felt it only right that the American merchant marine should transport the goods which Belgium bought in the United States; and (3) because they felt that the lead of the United States would be followed by other neutral ship-owning powers.
On August 28th the President had told both the Belgian Ambassador and the Netherlands Minister that should war come the United States was interested (a) in the maintenance of neutral trade, and (b) in maintaining open a sea lane to Antwerp and Rotterdam. The Belgian Ambassador had never been clear as to whether the President referred to an actual marked channel or whether he was using the words “sea lane” as an image to mean the continuance of shipping from the United States to Belgium.
Accordingly the Belgian Ambassador had called on the Under Secretary, who told him that as he saw the problem it possessed three phases: (1) The State Department would consult the Navy Department and obtain its opinion as to whether it was safer for American ships to sail through the English Channel or via the Norwegian Coast and the North Sea; (2) following the receipt of the Navy’s opinion the American Government would discuss matters with the British Government; (3) thereupon the American Government would initiate discussions with the neutral nations covering not only shipping but cargoes.
The Belgian Counselor then enumerated the dangers or inconveniences to American shipping destined for Belgium. He excluded danger from German submarines as he said that it was to Germany’s interest to have cargoes carried to neutral ports, even if none of them were re-exported to Germany. The physical danger therefore was concentrated in mines, either anchored or floating. The inconveniences resulted in the delays attendant to visit and search, which in turn depended upon agreements, express or implied, between the United States and Great Britain regarding contraband and the quantities of goods which might enter Belgium.
[Page 738]Inasmuch as the Belgian Ambassador had heard nothing from Mr. Welles or any official of the American Government for nearly two weeks Baron de Gruben came to ask me what I could, with propriety, tell him.
I replied that the problem he had raised could be divided into two parts. The one dealt with shipping, on which I would have to inform myself. The other and bigger problem dealt with the maintenance of trade between the United States and neutral countries. On this I said considerable progress had been made. A sub-committee was in existence which had canvassed the matter in some detail and had obtained the views of the various interested Departments. This committee had nearly completed the formulation of its recommendations, and as soon as these had been approved the Belgian Ambassador or Baron de Gruben would be invited down to discuss the matter further. In general, we took the position that it was to our interest to see that as much of a normal trade as possible between the United States and neutrals, which was for their own use, should be maintained. Baron de Gruben replied that he hoped we would take the leadership of the neutral nations in waging the fight for neutral rights. I replied that I thought that in his word picture he was using colors altogether too vivid. He said that he had expressed his hope rather than his anticipation, but that in any event the European neutrals would have to follow the lead of the United States, whatever that lead might be.
He said that in theory there was no way to reconcile the British and German views. Britain was going to bend every effort to make Belgium cease exporting to Germany. Germany was going to insist on its normal trade with Belgium, although it would allow Belgium to carry on its normal trade with Great Britain. As there was no logical way to merge these two different conceptions, the problem resolved itself into working out the best modus operandi possible. I said that I agreed, and that I thought it would be not one but a perpetual series of working arrangements that we would be engaged in from now on.
Baron de Gruben then changed the subject and asked whether it was true that the United States had advised the British Government to make its purchases through a special mission of its own rather than through J. P. Morgan or some other large bank in New York. I replied that I did not think that this Government had given any advice, but that I did know that there was considerable feeling throughout administration circles that Britain and France would have made a mistake had they chosen a New York bank as their purchasing agents.
The rest of the conversation dealt with the probable course of the war and the dangers to which Belgium felt herself exposed.