740.00112 European War 1939/30: Telegram
The Minister in the Netherlands (Gordon) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:19 p.m.]
160. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Secretary General has just sent for me and put the following before me in strictest confidence.
Yesterday a meeting was held at Breda between the Belgian and Dutch blockade and trade delegates (see my 147, September 1, 2 p.m.). They had before them for discussion a draft agreement proposed to them by the British.
Article 1 provides for reaching agreement as to maximum quantities of certain commodities to be exported by the neutral country directly or indirectly to Germany, the neutral country to supply the British Government with monthly statistics of the export and reexport of such commodities to all destinations in Europe.
Article 2 limits to a quantity to be agreed upon, the export of certain commodities from Britain into the neutral country; such imports to be utilized only for domestic consumption and not to be exported from the neutral country directly or indirectly.
In this draft proposal no actual quantities are mentioned under articles 1 and 2.
Articles 3 and 4 are unimportant.
Article 5 provides that pending the negotiations respecting the unsettled quantities above mentioned the neutral country will take necessary steps by means of export licenses or otherwise to enable the exportation to all destinations in Europe of certain listed commodities to be checked and will not permit the export to Germany in any one month of more than one-twelfth of the average annual export of such commodity to Germany during a period of years which is not specified in the draft.
[Page 723]Article 6 earnestly desires [sic] the agreement is to remain in force for 1 month after signature and thereafter for successive periods of 3 months if not denounced 1 month before the end of any such period.
List of commodities to be checked under article 5 covers a very wide range. Will not cable list unless desired; the immediate important point now seems to be the principle underlying the British offer.
Along with the draft proposal the British gave the Dutch and Belgians the British Order in Council of September 4 enumerating articles of absolute and of conditional contraband (I presume the Department already has the contents of this order to refer to).
Although they have not specifically been told so the Dutch understand that this proposal was made to the other Oslo states.10 The Dutch inquired if it was made to Italy and were told that it had not been; this presumably is because transit trade from Italy to Germany is so relatively insignificant that the British are not concerned therewith.
The Dutch state that their position is considerably different from the Belgians: firstly, the Dutch have a large mercantile fleet. Secondly, Holland is predominantly agricultural and Belgium may be considered predominantly industrial; consequently Belgium does not need very much more export trade than what she can carry on with allied and neutral countries and her industrial exports do not consist of articles primarily required by Germany. It is represented Germany is greatly interested in acquiring Dutch agricultural exports.
The Dutch view this British proposal as a very clever move; they feel that it is not only in Britain’s natural interest but also that the manner in which it has been advanced is calculated to win favor in the United States. The Dutch realize that the British want to prevent a repetition of 1914, when much larger stocks than were needed for internal consumption were imported into Holland. Between 1914 and 1918 the British gradually tightened up on that process. Now the whole matter may be again presented for decision at once and the Dutch wonder if in filling out the quantities of commodities under articles 1 and 2 the British will not try to approximate the situation obtaining in 1918. While article 5 envisages a provisional limitation to normal annual exports to Germany—and the Dutch consider this perfectly reasonable—the Dutch have no reason to feel any assurance that the implementing of articles 1 and 2 will be based on any such reasonable limitation.
Moreover, the Dutch ask themselves if a country desirous above all of maintaining real neutrality can “even under duress” agree with [Page 724] one belligerent to limit exportation to an opposing belligerent. If they enter into an arrangement of the nature proposed with England will not Germany insist that they are not being neutral? The Dutch also are naturally apprehensive that while Germany may be prepared not to object to pursuance of normal Dutch trade with England provided the Dutch keep up their normal trade with Germany (see my 150, September 2, 1 p.m.11) she will actively retaliate if various commodities essential to her which she has normally been getting from the Dutch are put on the proscribed list by Great Britain (hence the importance of the list of commodities to be checked, which includes, for instance, rubber, tin, and bauxite, and of the Order in Council).
On the other hand it is possible that Germany might listen to practical argument: namely if the Dutch do not enter into an arrangement of this kind with the British they most probably will not get imports sufficient for even their own internal consumption needs and they certainly will be unable to export anything to Germany; if, however, they enter into such an arrangement they will reasonably get sufficient imports to permit them to export something to Germany.
These are the considerations the Dutch Government, and presumably the Belgian now, are now weighing.
Practically the whole Dutch mercantile fleet bound for Dutch ports is now held up in the Downs and the Dutch Government now has under consideration issuing an order “at any moment” (this is entirely necessary) for all homeward bound Dutch ships to go to neutral ports avoiding British waters. For instance, the Nieuw Amsterdam now en route from New York may be ordered to return there, though more probably it will be ordered to call, for instance, at a northern Spanish port.
There is no doubt that the question of being able to preserve their neutrality is causing the Dutch Government increasingly grave concern. Aside from the problem presented in this respect by the foregoing trade considerations the Dutch are definitely worried over the attitude taken by Germany concerning airplane flights over Holland: the amount of German complaint that Holland is not properly protecting her neutrality against England is entirely disproportionate to what has actually occurred (see my 154, September 4, 5 p.m.,11 in addition to which there have since been other cases of unidentified foreign airplanes—so far as is known in small quantities only—flying over Dutch territory) and is unpleasantly symptomatic mistake in tactics in drumming up frivolous excuses for subsequent drastic action on Germany’s part.
[Page 725]Will you please convey the foregoing to the President especially in view of the matter referred to in Department’s 69, August 30, 5 p.m.? Needless to say, it is essential that I be kept promptly informed of any further developments in that connection.
- i. e., Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, the states which signed the convention at Oslo, December 22, 1930; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxvi, p. 341. A new convention, signed May 28, 1937, at The Hague, included Finland and Luxembourg with the original group; for text, see ibid., vol. clxxx, p. 5.↩
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