740.00119 European War 1939/122: Telegram

The Chargé in Germany (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

1954–1956. Some time ago I had occasion to meet informally Schacht, former President of the Reichsbank, and he took the initiative in discussing the possibility of ending the war. In the course of the conversation Schacht endorsed the view which has been variously reported that mediation by the President might bring about peace and indicated his sympathy with those groups in Germany which were dissatisfied with the present leadership (see my 1524, September 30, 7 p.m.96). This conversation was inclusive and I did not resume it.

Recently a member of the Embassy who was acquainted with Schacht made a personal call on him during the course of which Schacht disclosed that some 3 weeks ago he had written to Leon Fraser97 referring to an invitation from the latter last February for Schacht to make an address before the Academy of Political Science in New York which had been declined and asking that a similar invitation be now extended to make a non-political address before some non-political institution. He had written to me that the invitation should be sent by cable en clair with a statement that the President had been consulted and had expressed no objections to his coming and that further the President would receive him should he call at the White House to pay his respects. He said that on the basis of such a [Page 522] telegram the German Government of which he was nominally still a Minister could not refuse to let him make the trip and declared his belief that the presentation of his ideas to the President of a solution of the European problem would launch a peace movement which would be ultimately accepted by all warring governments, his own included. Schacht did not disclose the details of his peace program but asserted that he had not discussed his project with any member of the Reich Government and requested that the Embassy refrain from sending anything in regard thereto unless by confidential cable in confidential code from a neutral country. I need not add in this connection that no intimation will be conveyed to Schacht as to any consideration or action which his foregoing statement may be receiving insofar as this Embassy is concerned.

In connection with the foregoing I may state that recently other unofficial and apparently entirely personal efforts to find some means of terminating the state of war while it is still limited in operation have come to my attention. The individuals involved in these efforts vary in their views as to whether peace might be brought about by the present regime in Germany or whether a modification of that regime must precede any such attempts. They all point, however, to the lack of war enthusiasm and even a growing discontent in the country in the face of the hardships suffered by the civilian population as a result of the present undeclared situation and emphasize the opinion that even a military victory for Germany would not compensate the sacrifices and devastations of a general war and that a defeat of Germany with a second Versailles would not only prove to be no lasting solution but would merely enure to the benefit of Soviet Russia. With a view to avoiding those two contingencies the necessity for laying the bases for a peace have been emphasized and although it has been impossible to determine what might actually constitute a peace program from the German standpoint various features of such a program may be adduced as emanating from different processes of thought in Germany. In the first place an immediate cessation of hostilities would be indicated as essential. Furthermore, certain arrangements affecting Bohemia, Moravia and Poland should certainly be envisaged. A system for the humane treatment of racial problems as well as for the appeasement of religious controversies should be determined. The question of colonies and German access to raw materials would also require attention. Furthermore, some plan of international collaboration both in the political and in the economic field should be established in which Germany would participate on the basis of equality and in this plan the problems of world financial and economic recovery and of disarmament would be included.

The foregoing items are based on conjecture or on impressions derived from indications received from different sources and are in [Page 523] no way exhaustive. Those in Germany who are opposed to the present regime apparently feel that some design for what they term a decent peace with the hope of economic reconstruction would gain the support of the moderate elements in Germany as well as of the army and if furthered by the President and accepted by the present opponents of Germany would, owing to the force of public opinion, eventually be accepted either by a reformed or by a changed leadership in the country. On the other hand there are those who maintain that even the present Government has been and may still be ready to endorse certain of the foregoing items and that the war need not be extended while efforts toward peace are regarded as still within the realm of possibility. Whatever may be the relative significance of these views, however, it is my opinion that a grave error of judgment would be committed if not only the probability were not faced that at the present stage such opposition to the regime as may exist in Germany would fail to force the abandonment of plans which may have been decided upon or may be in the process of decision but also if the possibility were not envisaged that drastic action might be precipitated thereby. The impression prevails that some delay in action has occurred but whether this apparent delay is due to continued regard for the possibility of a peace or to the perfection of plans for the further consolidation of German strength both at home and abroad or to some other consideration, it is believed that the final action either in war or in peace will now, as in the past, depend upon the conclusions at which Hitler will eventually arrive as to the means which he regards as best adapted to attain his aims and as to the time for their initiation.

Kirk
  1. Not printed.
  2. New York financier; former president of the Bank for International Settlements.