761.6211/306
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 1.]
Sir:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Soviet-German treaty59 for the partition of Poland requires little comment. The line establishing the frontier between the Soviet Union and Germany is clearly drawn according to ethnological lines.
The protocol referred to in article I, the details of which were not published, was signed on October 4 by the German Ambassador and Molotov in Moscow. The treaty was ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Government on October 19, 1939. In this connection, as reported in my telegram No. 702 of October 7, 9 p.m.60 I was authoritatively [Page 493] informed that Stalin had categorically refused to include within the territory to be retained by the Soviet Union an appreciable quantity of racial Poles. It is probable that Stalin desired to accept only territories inhabited by White Russians and Ukranians in the belief that should Germany be defeated in the present war and a Polish national state recreated as a result thereof, the absence of any appreciable quantity of Poles on the territory acquired by the Soviet Union would facilitate its retention.
From the point of view of general Soviet policy the most interesting article of the treaty is article II which recognizes the frontier as “final” and asserting flatly that both parties will “eliminate* any interference with this decision by third powers”, associates the Soviet Government in opposing what was at least one of the initial war aims of Great Britain and France.
The joint statement that both the Soviet and German Governments will direct their common efforts in agreement with other friendly powers, if necessary, to bring about peace and that if these efforts fail Great Britain and France will bear the responsibility for the continuance of the war, is a somewhat curious declaration on the part of the Foreign Minister of a country which professes to consider itself neutral in the present conflict. Viewed in this light it constitutes further evidence that the Soviet Union is in fact if not in law nearer to being an associate of the German Government than a neutral state.
The exchange of letters between Molotov and Von Ribbentrop dated September 28 announcing the intention of Germany and the Soviet Union to embark on an economic program under which the Soviet Union will supply Germany with raw materials in return for delivery of industrial goods “to be effected in the course of a lengthy period” is perhaps the most significant result of Von Ribbentrop’s second visit to Moscow. In view of the importance of this subject it will be made the subject of a special despatch following the conclusion of the economic negotiations which are still continuing in Moscow between the German economic mission and the Soviet authorities.61
In conclusion it may be stated that the result of Von Ribbentrop’s second visit outlined above constituted the logical development of the Soviet-German collaboration initiated by the treaty of non-aggression and consultation concluded on the occasion of his first visit.
Respectfully yours,
- Of September 28, 1939.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The literal translation of the Russian verb “ustranit” is “to put aside”. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- These negotiations were concluded by the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement signed in Moscow on February 11, 1940. For a discussion of the agreement, see the Foreign Office memorandum by Karl Schnurre, February 26, 1940, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1989–1941, p. 131.↩