740.00/561: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:08 p.m.]
165. I discussed the general European situation with Bonnet16 today. Bonnet said that he believed Germany did not desire war this spring. There was every indication that Hitler wished to employ the coming months to get Hungary and Rumania completely under his control. Hitler practically [controlled?] Hungary already but Rumania would be a more difficult problem. It would probably be necessary for Hitler to eject King Carol and replace him by his son Michael in order to establish full Nazi control over Rumania.
There was, however, great danger that Mussolini would start a war this spring.
[Page 8]Hitler had kept Mussolini quiet during the Austrian and Czecho Slovak crises17 by promising support for his aspirations in the Mediterranean. Mussolini now wished to cash in on this promise and might provoke an incident at any moment which would produce war with France.
Bonnet said that when Ribbentrop had been in Paris Ribbentrop had discussed this eventuality frankly and had said that Hitler was very much afraid of being drawn into war by Mussolini this spring. Ribbentrop had stated that Hitler had no desire whatsoever to have a war with France and England; but that Mussolini could inevitably draw him in by simply making war on France. Hitler could not afford to see Mussolini defeated which would be the inevitable result of a conflict between Italy and France without intervention by Germany.
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I had a long talk with the Polish Ambassador today who gave me a full account of Beck’s conversation with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. He said that Hitler had convinced Beck that he had no intention of attempting to make war on the Soviet Union this year. He said that Beck had stated to Hitler that as far as Poland was concerned the question of the Ruthenian end of Slovakia was not settled and that Poland might be obliged to settle it by her own military action if Ruthenia should be used in future as a base of propaganda against Poland. He stated that Hitler had not reacted in any way against this statement of Beck’s.
Lukasiewicz also said that Hitler and Beck had talked of Danzig and the question of transit for automobiles from Germany across the Polish Corridor to Danzig and East Prussia. Lukasiewicz said that Hitler and Beck had agreed that these questions should be worked out quietly and should not be permitted to interfere in any way with the good relations between the two countries.
Lukasiewicz said that the new Polish-Russian trade agreement which was about to be signed would result in Poland selling to the Soviet Union more than ten times as much next year as had been sold last year.
The Polish Government’s view of the general European situation as given me by Lukasiewicz was practically on all fours with the views given me by Bonnet and the British Ambassador. All three men believe that Hitler will not deliberately make war on any country this year. They all feel that there is great danger that Mussolini may start a war into which Hitler in justification will be drawn. All three of course indicated that they felt that fear of ultimate action [Page 9] by the United States might be a large factor in determining the decisions of Mussolini and Hitler.
Both the British and Polish Ambassadors and several French friends with whom I have talked have spoken to me with regard to the growing hostility in France to Bonnet. I have been here too short a time to have formed an independent opinion, but it appears that after Munich Daladier18 reaped all the thankfulness while Bonnet reaped all the rage.
- Georges Bonnet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- For correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. i, pp. 483 ff. and 707 ff., respectively.↩
- Èdouard Daladier, French President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for National Defense.↩