740.0011 European War 1939/1081: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 24—9:30 a.m.]
2815. Daladier said to me today that it was still extremely difficult for him to believe that the Germans would not attack somewhere this autumn. Since it now appeared that the attack which had been organized against the Netherlands, Belgium and France was less probable than it had been 10 days ago, he thought that the Germans might attempt an operation to the southeast.
He had reason to believe that the Germans were attempting to reach agreement with the Soviet Union which would permit Germany to occupy Hungary and a piece of Rumania while the Soviet Union should occupy the remainder of Rumania. He also had reason to believe that the Germans were attempting to reach an agreement with Italy for a division of Yugoslavia and Greece which would give Germany control on Salonika. He had no indication however that these attempts of the Germans to reach agreements with the Soviet Union and Italy were meeting with success.
In spite of the development of public opinion in Italy favorable to France and England it appeared that Mussolini personally had not given up his hope to be able to acquire large territories by cooperation with Germany.
It was obvious that Turkey from the point of view of France and England was the key to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turks were displaying their customary courage and he was determined to support Turkey to the limit under any and all circumstances.
Daladier said that his information with regard to Germany’s plans to move toward the southeast was fragmentary and not altogether [Page 475] convincing. He found it even more difficult to believe however that the German Army would remain altogether quiescent and that Germany would attempt to win the war merely by use of planes, submarines and mines, counting on an exhaustion of France and England before the exhaustion of Germany.
The latter theory is not held by many members of the Government in Paris who point out that since the blockade has to cover the entire area from the Rhine to Vladivostok Germany may well hope to be able to hold on until the exhaustion of the financial, economic and shipping resources of France and England.
The fact is that the present inaction on the western front is so complete and so contrary to expectation that all responsible public officials in France are engaged in inventing explanations which have a greater basis in imagination and logic than through the facts and events. Almost anything may happen. No one knows what will.