740.0011 European War 1939/1022: Telegram
The Minister in Hungary (Montgomery) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10 p.m.]
311. Referring to Department’s telegram 251, November 13, and the Legation’s telegram No. 310, November 14,2 the Prime Minister yesterday [Page 469] took occasion to converse at length with me regarding the international situation and Hungary in particular at a small intimate tea to which his wife had invited me informally on the preceding day. Since for some time he had been in many respects reticent to me and to the Ministers of the belligerent countries I found his behavior astonishing but my British colleague confided to me this morning that he had had a similar experience and he attributed Count Teleki’s action to Hungarian conviction that the war was not favoring Germany and it now served future Hungarian interests to deal in a more friendly and open manner with the Allied Powers (though the Prime Minister has not seen Loeb which omission O’Malley3 attributed to a distrust of the French) and the United States. The Prime Minister’s attitude was consistent with that of the Foreign Minister who, when last I spoke with him, actually showed an anti-German trend of mind.
Speaking calmly and apparently undisturbed by the international situation Count Teleki said substantially the following: Germany’s main objective was to destroy Great Britain in the course of which in the present war three avenues lay open to Germany—a direct attack upon Great Britain which now was difficult, a thrust through Switzerland which however had the undesired feature of leading to France, and the invasion of (one or both) the Netherlands and Belgium to obtain bases from which to attack Great Britain directly but in this she was deterred for the moment by fear of American public opinion which she did not wish to arouse against her. The only alternative was a direct attack on the Maginot Line which Germany ultimately might be compelled to undertake. No decision for a definite plan of campaign yet had been made because of divided counsel. In consequence Germany’s attention was diverted by this situation and there was no menace by her to small countries until a campaign had been initiated and had failed following which, to bolster up public opinion, a German conquest of a small country might be expedient. However, other small states such as those of the Oslo group4 and Switzerland for logical and more strategic reasons were in greater danger than was Hungary. There was no present advantage to make a thrust to the southeast because independent Hungary and Rumania best could supply Germany with foodstuffs and oil. Germany had expressed no thought of and made no suggestion of requesting the passage of troops through Hungary to attack Rumania. On the contrary she had expressed a desire for amicable relations between Hungary and Rumania in order that her oil supply should not be interrupted. Russia and Italy were additional factors against German invasion of Hungary. [Page 470] Russia’s entire program was made in preparation of a distant and eventual struggle with Germany. The two countries had agreed to maintain peace in Southeastern Europe to enable Germany to receive supplies but Russia would do all possible to prevent Germany from reaching the Black Sea.
Italy considered Hungary her closest friend and supporter and Hungary had consulted her in every action since the outbreak of war. Italian attitude toward the Axis had remained unreconcilable but a German attack on Hungary represented a virtual attack on Italy and undoubtedly such action would orientate Italy to the west if not bring her into the war on the side of the Allies. Yugoslavia also could not remain impassive to an invasion of Hungary aimed at her ally Rumania and it was conceivable that ultimately she might come to the assistance of Hungary with the backing of Italy. Consequently a German attack on Hungary or Rumania was improbable under present conditions but not impossible. Hungary would never consent to the entrance or passage of German troops and would resist such action, though perhaps hopelessly, to the end. The Russian and Slovak frontiers were being fortified and it was hoped ultimately to fortify the entire northern frontier to which Germany could not object because she herself was fortifying her Russian frontier.
The Prime Minister also denied rumors of his serious illness and probable resignation and said there would be no approval of Cabinet reshuffle.
The British Minister expressed to me his entire agreement with the Prime Minister’s conclusions.
The Rumanian Minister this morning denied to me having any knowledge of a German request for the passage of troops through Hungary although he had heard rumors to that effect from time to time.