740.0011 European War 1939/587: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 28—7:15 a.m.]
630. In view of the rapid succession of events relating to Soviet policy at the present time, the ultimate end and aim of which are not yet clear, I believe that certain considerations which in my opinion are affecting the course being pursued by the Soviet Union at the present time will be of value, especially as from the beginning of Soviet-German collaboration there has been a strong tendency in French and British diplomatic circles here to entertain the hope that friction has or will shortly arise between the two countries. This tendency has been especially manifest since the establishment of the line of demarcation between German and Soviet troops which admittedly turns over to the Russian armies a much larger portion of Poland than had heretofore been anticipated. The view is expressed in British and French circles that this line was dictated by Stalin and forced upon Hitler against the latter’s will and is based upon the reasoning that by the establishment of this line the Russian forces obtain the Galician oil fields and now block German access to Rumania and that in consequence Germany has become dependent upon Russian goodwill in respect of supplies of oil from Rumania. It is further argued that Germany is likewise now precluded from opposing any Soviet aims in respect of the Baltic.
It is now almost certain that genuine confidence cannot exist between Stalin and Hitler and that when the former conceives it to be in the interest of the Soviet Union he will not hesitate to betray [Page 456] his agreement with Hitler. I am unable to share the optimism of my French and British colleagues that this eventuality is in any way imminent.
While it is quite possible that the line of the Vistula was at Soviet request I have no evidence to support the view that it was drawn against any real opposition coming from Germany. Far from denoting friction between Soviet Russia and German Government I regard it as further indication of far-reaching cooperation between the two Governments. The line was arrived at according to my information without delay and when agreed upon was at least 4 or 5 days march in advance of positions occupied by the Russian troops. I furthermore [point out?] as of considerable significance the fact reported in my telegram No. 620, September 26, 10 p.m.,85 that the Soviet Government demanded from the Estonian Foreign Minister last Sunday a further increase of transit and storage facilities in Estonia for Soviet goods which could only be bound for Germany. The Estonian source from which this information was received stated that it was his impression that in pressing its demands in this respect the Soviet Government had been clearly acting in the interests if not at the direct behest of Germany. Furthermore, the fact that Ribbentrop,86 whatever may be the real purpose of his visit to Moscow today, will be here at the same time as the Turkish Foreign Minister would appear to indicate close Soviet-German cooperation in matters affecting the Balkans and the Black Sea. It is possible that in addition to settling certain questions dealing with the fate of Poland, Ribbentrop and Stalin will work out with the acquiescence of Turkey a scheme for the neutralization of the Balkans and the Black Sea area. It is likewise of some significance that the first public report of Ribbentrop’s impending visit to Moscow came from Japanese sources. It may therefore well be that some arrangement in respect the Far East will be discussed.
- Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, p. 941.↩
- Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩