740.0011 European War 1939/514: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
Paris, September
24, 1939—6 p.m.
[Received 8:40 p.m.]
[Received 8:40 p.m.]
2152. Ambassador Biddle has asked me to transmit the following which is a summary of “factors which contributed to Poland’s defeat. [”] Memorandum strictly confidential.
- (a)
- Suddenness of attack.
- Fighting started between 4 and 5 a.m. at numerous points along western frontier from south to Danzig. Warsaw in general was awakened by air raid at 7 o’clock the morning of Friday, September 1.
- (b)
- Immediate demolition of airplane and motor-manufacturing plants and pilot training schools. Within 4 days after commencement of hostilities nothing left in terms of Polish planes other than those already in use. The means no longer existed for production of planes or training of pilots.
- (c)
- Destruction or failure of means of communication. In this connection there was a lack of ample field short wave radio apparati and adequate number of motorcycle despatch riders and messengers and to my mind undue reliance was placed on mechanical method such as telo-wiring (which experience showed is not practical for field work wherein lines are subject to aerial bombardments. This means that the telo-wiring lines are too dependent upon wire maintenance to be practical in face of severe bombing). There was no central command after the first few days of hostilities.
- (d)
- Constant bombardment of railway communication retarded and in numerous cases impeded movements of troops and supplies.
- (e)
- Failure to prepare an effective defensive position (Marshal Smigly-Rydz80 pointed out to General Ironside81 during latter’s Warsaw [Page 452] visit previous to hostilities) that the Polish high command had in mind the Polish armies’ withdrawal under cover of delayed action to a line approximately running from Grudziadz in north through Bydgosz, Tarun, Lodz and Krakow in south to Slovak border. General Ironside had expressed his approval of such a move if and when circumstances made it necessary.
- (f)
- Dry weather rendered all of Poland a sort of dry hard plain, facilitating passage of tanks in all directions. Moreover the visibility was clear and planes could fly anywhere.
- (g)
- German air superiority prevented secret concentration of Polish troops for counter attack. Polish Army showed tendency in most cases to become engaged in pitched battles (the Polish troops allowed themselves to become engaged by the enemy at various points instead of effecting a delay action either to cover the establishment of main defense lines or maneuvering position).
- (h)
- Failure of French-British front to afford relief through diversion activities especially in the air.
- (i)
- Delay of France and Great Britain in declaring war. While reasons therefor are understandable (special circumstances in each case) nevertheless the bare fact was that Poles were rushed off their feet.
- (j)
- Impossibility of agricultural state fighting highly industrialized state. In fact many Polish soldiers never saw a German soldier, only tanks and planes. (However in many cases when Polish infantry or cavalry contacted the infantry or cavalry of the enemy the Poles demonstrated their superiority.)
- (k)
- The large minority in the loosely knit Polish state proved easy prey for German espionage (such as the spreading of destructive rumors and alarming news).
- (i)
- Poles were afforded no time to revise their military leadership in certain cases where required to adapt their tactics to meet German strategy and to rest their troops.
- (l)
- [sic] During the latter phases the aerial bombardments demoralized the civilian population, prevented the Government from functioning properly, effectively, and harassed G.H.Q.
- (m)
- Long lines of refugees frequently cut across troops on march, took possession of army supplies and requisitioned rail transport thus contributing to some extent towards demoralizing the Polish troops who thereby learned that their homes were being demolished and their families wounded and killed.
- (n)
- Notwithstanding the foregoing there was still a possibility of reconstructing a short front line as the air attacks lessened. Then the Soviet delivered the “coup de grace”.
- (o)
- In conclusion only an industrial country organized along totalitarian lines and as ruthless as the enemy could face the recent German [Page 453] attack unless (a) geographical or (b) climatic conditions or (c) previously prepared defensive position might enable it to hold out long enough (d) for some industrialized ally to knock out the enemy’s factories, communications and airdromes.
- (p)
- In the case of Poland (a) (b) (c) (d) were all lacking.
Bullitt