760C.62/1187: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 30—1:20 p.m.]
1321. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. My 1315, August 30, noon.86 I just saw Halifax and before that Butler, Parliamentary Under-Secretary. He showed me the Cabinet draft of the answer to Hitler. In its present form it is, I should say, a little too firm with Hitler and I have an idea that Halifax will tone it down before it is finally sent. I think that Chamberlain, Halifax, Cadogan and Butler realize that there is a great deal of negotiation still to be done and that too firm a hand, which might preclude Hitler from finding any basis on which he can quit with honor, might be very disastrous. The Cabinet, on the other hand, as a whole feel that they have Hitler on the run and want to make it as tough as possible.
This afternoon Chamberlain secretly sent what to all intents is a personal letter to Hitler,87 but which actually comes from the head of one state to the head of another, telling him that he appreciates the desire of Hitler to maintain cordial and friendly relations with Great Britain and that Great Britain desires the same, but he urges him not to demand an immediate response from Poland. As you know, in the message from Hitler last night he demanded that a Polish representative [Page 387] be there today. In addition Chamberlain suggests that summoning a special Polish representative to Berlin might not be the method most conducive to friendly discussions and that the declaration which Hitler is drawing up of his demands might better be submitted to Poland through its Ambassador in Berlin.
It may be of interest to note that a new kind of contact has been arranged. Goering88 who is back in the picture with Hitler has delegated two of his intimate friends to fly back and forth between Berlin and London to get the personal English touch from the topside men in the British Government, immediately flying back to give it personally to Goering and Hitler. That is the answer to the so-called mystery planes that the press have been trying to find out about. Butler claims that this is aiding the relationship very much, because it is keeping almost a personal contact.
The Halifax–Butler opinion really places the beginning of a strong anti-war group in Germany to the immediate result of the Russian-German pact. Mussolini has telephoned again and is really making almost panicky efforts to persuade the British that he is working for the cause of peace. He has almost isolated himself from the pro-German group in Italy.
There are two great dangers, as Halifax views it now: one is that the attitude of Britain will become too overbearing to Hitler by such methods as holding him up to ridicule in the British press or saying that they have put him in his place, et cetera, et cetera, thus leaving no hope in his own mind that after this is over he has a real possibility of making economic peace with Great Britain; the other danger is that the Poles becoming overconfident as a result of Hitler’s seeming backing down will become too drastic and figure that they have Hitler on the run and refuse to negotiate in a way to save a world war. Butler says that the Italians and the French are now attempting to get over reproaching the Poles. These are the two difficulties that Chamberlain is trying to work out now in order not to find himself in a position where he might get peace on fair terms and find himself in the middle of a war. The Polish situation gives them great concern.
Butler said that they have already discussed with the Cabinet the necessity for immediately taking up the question of colonies if they can settle this Polish problem, in order that these September crises will not continue to occur. He says it is a bitter pill for them, but the pill is about three-quarters way down their stomach.