760C.62/1137: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 29—10:25 a.m.]
1644. I have just read the official and authentic text of the note which Henderson handed to Hitler last night. This text reached Paris at 10 o’clock this morning.
It shows that the summaries which aroused apprehension in Paris last night that Great Britain might be about to attempt to disintegrate Polish resistance were misleading.
Briefly the British note states that Hitler’s communication to Henderson raises two definite problems. The first is the question of the dispute between Germany and Poland and the second, the relations between Great Britain and Germany.
Germany is reminded that the British Government has entered into engagements to protect the independence of Poland and that these engagements will be fulfilled.
The opinion is expressed that the best way to settle the dispute between Poland and Germany is by direct negotiation between those two countries and that any settlement reached should be guaranteed by other powers.
The note states that the Polish Government has informed the British Government that it will be glad to enter into negotiations with the German Government on this basis.
Hitler is reminded that in his declaration of last April he acknowledged Poland’s interest in Danzig.
Reference is made to the necessity of both Poland and Germany restraining publication of unfounded rumors of atrocities.
The promise is then made that if a solution should be reached by Germany and Poland through direct negotiations, Great Britain would be glad to discuss at once with Germany economic problems and disarmament.
In my opinion the note is excellent and shows no inclination on the part of Great Britain to play the same role vis-à-vis Poland that Great Britain played vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia.
[Page 381]Bonnet who gave me the note said that he was completely satisfied by it. He felt that Germany certainly would not make war without further negotiations.
Hitler, he understood from Berlin, intended to reply to the British note this afternoon.
Whatever the outcome of these British-German negotiations his information from Italy was that Mussolini was becoming increasingly reluctant to go to war on the side of Germany against France and England. Since the conclusion of the German-Russian agreement Mussolini seemed to be almost without influence on Hitler. The Italians were beginning to suspect that the German-Russian agreement went much further than commonly assumed and that Hitler no longer cared greatly about Mussolini’s assistance and planned eventually to swallow Italy.
Under the circumstances an Italian intervention in the form of a proposal of a general conference at the eleventh hour, even after general mobilization on all sides, appeared to be highly [apparent omission].
Bonnet added that Molotov would visit Berlin in the near future and stated that he had absolute proof that the Soviet Government had just sold an enormous quantity of gasoline to the German Government, thus providing Germany with the means it did not have to use to the full for a long period its air fleet and mechanized units.