Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, Volume I

761.6211/121: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Warsaw, August 25, 1939—7 p.m.
[Received August 25—4:25 p.m.]

209. For the President and the Secretary.

1. Beck imparted he had never seen an infuriated Jap until his yesterday’s conversation with Professor Sakoh⁶⁰ when latter raged against Germany for having double-crossed Japan through signing up with Russia without at least advance notice to Japan in accordance with secret clause contained in Anti-Comintern Pact.⁶¹

2. Jouvenal of Paris Soir imparted that in his conversation with Ribbentrop at Koenigsberg (en route to Moscow) Ribbentrop had given him impression he visualized non-aggression agreement with Moscow as an alliance. This gave rise to suspicion amongst competent observers in diplomatic and press circles here that Hitler’s plans now envisage tempting Russia to become dominating Asiatic power thus giving Germany free hand to gain domination of Europe. Beck and associates, however, are still skeptical as to extent to which Berlin might rely upon Moscow.

3. Beck moreover imparted Soviet Ambassador Charanov yesterday resorted to minor frontier incident as pretext to point out that Moscow’s non-aggression agreement with Berlin would not alter Moscow’s relations with Warsaw. (This contradicts today’s story emanating from Associated Press office in Berlin to effect Charanov proposed in Molotov’s behalf a formula for the solution of Polish-German differences and Molotov’s recommendation that Warsaw accept formula.)

4. Beck labels as Nazi inspired propaganda Berlin Associated Press office’s aforementioned as well as following reports: (a) of yesterday, that Hitler was yesterday sending ultimatum giving Warsaw choice between Beck’s presence in Berchtesgaden and war and (b) of today, that Nazi circles discerned weakening on the part of London and Warsaw and were openly intimating that if those capitals were going to make concessions they had better do so before it was too late.

5. I am inclined to feel that in trying to use all available foreign agencies as instruments of their propaganda in an intensified effort to whip up crisis atmosphere Nazi Government’s disappointment over failure of effectiveness of report (a) above resulted in their subsequent inspiration of report (b) above. Moreover, resort to inspiration of rumors of this character indicates to my mind a state of indecision in Hitler’s mind.

Biddle

60. Shuichi Sakoh, Japanese Ambassador in Poland.
61. Signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 153. For text of the secret agreement, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. i, p. 734, footnote 2a.