761.62/516: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Grummon) to the Secretary of State

256. The following information has been received with reference to the subject of the Embassy’s strictly confidential telegram No. 251, May 17, 11 a.m.

On his return to Berlin from Tehran the German Ambassador was told by Ribbentrop, obviously reflecting Hitler’s views, that in the opinion of the German Government Communism had ceased to exist in the Soviet Union; that the Communist International was no longer a factor of importance in Soviet foreign relations and that consequently it was felt that no real ideological barrier remained between Germany and Russia. Under the circumstances it was desired that the Ambassador return to Moscow to convey very discreetly to the Soviet Government the impression that Germany entertained no animosity toward it and to endeavor to ascertain the present Soviet attitude toward Soviet-German relations. Ribbentrop impressed [Page 320] upon the Ambassador the necessity of exercising the greatest caution in the premises as any appearance of a German approach to the Soviet Union would alarm Japan, which in view of the special relationship existing between Germany and that country would be very undesirable. In reply to the Ambassador’s query as to whether in view of the Soviet-British negotiations76 some more specific and direct approach would not be desirable, Ribbentrop replied that the German Government was not alarmed at the prospect of an agreement between Great Britain and the Soviet Union as it was not convinced that England and France would be disposed to lend extensive or wholehearted military assistance to any country in Eastern Europe. Ribbentrop then told the Ambassador that Germany desired mediation to settle the question of Danzig and the auto-road across the Corridor and that even in the event of a conflict with Poland, Germany had no intention of attempting to occupy the whole of that country. Ribbentrop’s instructions were oral and they left to the Ambassador’s discretion the manner of bringing the foregoing to the attention of the Soviet Government. The impression, however, was received that without committing the German Government to any line of action vis-à-vis the Soviet Government, he was to convey an indication of the change in attitude on the part of the higher circles in Berlin toward this country as well as the assurance that Germany was in favor of the maintenance of an independent Poland. Despite Ribbentrop’s statement to the contrary it was believed that the purpose of this approach was not unconnected with the Soviet-British negotiations.

In conveying the above information it was emphasized that the Ambassador’s instructions were general in nature and could not yet be taken as a definite German proposal to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, although a possible first step in that direction, and that future developments along this line would depend upon the reaction encountered by the Ambassador in his conversations here. In this connection it was stated that officials of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and especially the Counselor, Astakhov,77 have intimated recently to members of the German Foreign Office that Soviet foreign policy was now on a new basis,78 a statement which has been repeated here to a German correspondent by the new Chief of the Press Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

In view of the nature of this information which has been obtained from the source indicated previously which in the past has proved [Page 321] reliable it is requested that in any use which the Department may make of the foregoing every effort be made to protect both its source and place of origin.

Grummon
  1. For the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations attempting to reach an agreement against aggression, see pp. 232 ff.
  2. Georgy Alexandrovich Astakhov.
  3. See the German Foreign Office memoranda of May 9 and May 17, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, pp. 3 and 4.