741.61/828½
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
[Received August 29.]
My Dear Mr. Welles: This letter is in reply to your personal and strictly confidential letter of August 4.
On the morning of August 11, the Voelkischer Beobachter of Berlin carried a news report from its Moscow correspondent to the effect that “Upon the visit to Molotov of the American Ambassador, before the presentation of his credentials, he handed to the Soviet Foreign Commissar a detailed letter from President Roosevelt dealing with international affairs” (see telegram number 776, August 11, 2 p.m., from our Berlin Embassy to the Department36).
On the morning of August 14, the Moscow press published an official denial by the Tass Agency of the existence of any such letter or of the alleged details of its supposed contents as set forth by a Polish newspaper (Illustrovany Kurer Codzenny)37 (See my telegram number 445 of August 14, 11 a.m., to the Department.)36
On August 15 at 11 a.m., Mr. MacArthur, Second Secretary of our Embassy in Paris, arrived in Moscow and immediately handed me your letter under seal. The receipt by me on August 15 of your letter was, of course, the first knowledge that anyone in this Embassy, including myself, had of the existence of your letter to me.
From the foregoing chronology, I think there are two inescapable conclusions to be drawn: (1) that Oumansky—who arrived in Moscow about three weeks ago—in reporting his conversation with the President to Molotov must have intimated that the President was sending a communication to Molotov which would be brought by me, and that in consequence rumor of the supposed existence of such a letter was deliberately inspired by Soviet sources—presumably to serve some Soviet purpose in connection with the pending Anglo-French and German negotiations; (2) the fact that the rumor appeared first in the Voelkischer Beobachter, whereas the denial was aimed at the same item appearing two days later in a Polish newspaper, indicates that the Soviet authorities in inspiring the rumor desired that it come to the attention of the German authorities.
Immediately upon receipt of your letter, I requested an interview with Mr. Molotov, which was granted this afternoon. I conveyed the message verbally, exactly as it appears in your letter to me, and [Page 297] after doing so inquired of Molotov whether there were any views that he cared to express. As it is the practice here for an interpreter to take down everything an Ambassador says, I could see no reason why I should not take down Molotov’s reply, to which he acquiesced, so that the following is a word-for-word transcript of his reply.
He started by saying that the views I had just conveyed to him were of great interest and value to his Government, which considers the situation in Europe at the present time to be most serious, and that in consequence his Government was attaching great importance to the pending negotiations with Britain and France. He then said that he well understood that the United States was “aside” from taking any “immediate” part in European affairs, but that he knew that President Roosevelt held close to his heart a deep interest in and desire for the preservation of world peace, and that for this reason his Government would attach the greatest interest and the utmost importance to the views just expressed. He continued, that from the start of the negotiations with Britain and France his Government had been unwilling that the negotiations should end “in merely general declarations”; that he did not regard general declarations as sufficient; that for this reason at the beginning of the negotiations and “even now” his Government had been and was insisting that any agreement must deal with “obligations of mutual assistance in order to counteract any possible aggression in Europe.” He then stated categorically “We are not interested in declarations. We are desirous that the present negotiations lead to a determination of the action to be taken under specific conditions or circumstances—and that there shall be mutual obligations to counteract an aggression.” He observed that the mutual obligations to be undertaken were only to be of a defensive character in Europe, and “We would not go into any agreement aiming at an attack on anybody.” He stopped at this point, indicating that he had nothing further to say; and, in the hope of encouraging him to continue, I asked to have his last two or three comments restated. As restated, these comments read: “All of the negotiations with Britain and France which have taken place thus far we value, in so far as they may lead to an agreement for mutual defensive assistance against direct or indirect aggression in Europe.”
I then asked him whether it was a fair question for me to request his personal opinion as to the probable outcome of the negotiations. To this he replied “We have spent much time negotiating—this shows we expect the negotiations to succeed—but we are not to be blamed for the delay—the delay has not been caused by us alone. At present I cannot say any more to you than I have already said—what the outcome of the negotiations will be depends on the others as much as on us. Much has already been done towards success and, as you [Page 298] know, the negotiations are continuing.” Alter the customary amenities, the interview was concluded.
I should add that at the commencement of the interview I stressed the confidential nature of what I was about to say and obtained Mr. Molotov’s assurance that there would be no publicity as a result of anything I might say and that the strictest confidence would be observed. At the close of the interview, I again enjoined secrecy upon him, to which he nodded his assent vigorously. I even went so far as to say to him that unless I could be certain that conversations on matters of a confidential nature would be treated as such I would find the difficulties of a frank exchange of views materially enhanced. To this he replied that he quite understood the situation.
It is my personal impression, from the limited background I have been able to pick up since my recent arrival here, and from the atmosphere surrounding my talk with Molotov—which, as you know, is frequently more important than the words spoken—that while the Soviet authorities are genuinely desirous that peace should be preserved, they are particularly anxious to avoid being drawn into any European conflict—at least at the beginning, if for no other reason than because of their internal difficulties and the threat to their political as well as economic program which would result from the outbreak of a general European war at the present time, the guiding principle of their European policy being to assure the non-violation of their frontiers; and they are deliberately carrying on negotiations with the French and British on the one hand and the Germans on the other, in the hope of thereby avoiding the outbreak of war before the beginning of October; that with this object in view they are intentionally dragging the negotiations out with the hope of finding Japan in a weaker position by next spring, the British and French rearmament progressed to the point where they need no longer fear Germany and can then take advantage of these developments by expanded commercial relations with Germany—which would be much to their advantage—while at the same time presenting a more aggressive front to Japan in the Far East. In all of my interviews thus far with the various higher officials of the Soviet Government, I have been forcibly struck by their active interest in and their repeated references to the situation in the Far East and their apparent indifference to the European situation. (For greater detail on this subject, I take the liberty of referring you to several despatches which I have sent to the Department in the past two or three days.)38
In accordance with the instructions contained in the closing paragraph of your letter to me, I sent you a personal telegram this afternoon [Page 299] immediately after returning from the Kremlin, reading “Message delivered.”
Mr. MacArthur is taking this letter with him tomorrow to Paris.
With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
- Not printed.↩
- Ilustrowany Kurjer Codzienny of Cracow.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See despatch No. 16, August 16, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, p. 775.↩