740.00/1887: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 7—2:52 p.m.]
1269. This afternoon Bonnet said to me that the instructions had now been sent to the British and French Ambassadors in Moscow ordering them to say to the Soviet Government that the Soviet definition of indirect aggression was totally unacceptable to the French and British Governments. He said that the portion of the Soviet note which had especially shocked the French and British was the phrase that any change in the make-up of the Government of any of the Baltic States which tended to favor an aggressor “must lead to immediate military action by the Soviet Union, France and England.” Bonnet added that this phrase if accepted would make it possible for the Soviet Union to invade any of the Baltic States at any minute on any flimsy pretext with the armed support of France and England. It was obvious that neither France nor England could accept any such proposal.
Bonnet added that the French and British Ambassadors in Moscow had been given a large number of alternative definitions of aggression which they would propose to Molotov tomorrow, requesting him to [Page 284] choose from among them. They had also been ordered to inform the Soviet Union that France and England were ready to adjourn immediate signature of an agreement with regard to Switzerland and Holland provided the Russians would agree to discuss the matter later.
I asked Bonnet if he still thought the negotiations with the Soviet Union could be brought to a successful conclusion. He replied that he really had no idea. The Russian demands had been so extraordinary that he was no longer certain that the Soviet Government really desired to reach agreement.
He asked me if I had any information as to conversations between the Soviet Government and the German Government. I replied that I had not. He said that the French information indicated that discussions were going on but that they probably were confined to commercial matters.
As I said in my No. 1253 July 5, 1 p.m. I should be greatly obliged if you could give me any information on this subject which has reached you recently.
Bonnet said that relations between France and Poland were again becoming intimate. British and French loans to Poland would be given in the course of the next few days. The Poles had explained their position with regard to Danzig in detail to both the French and British Governments and their plans had received the fullest approval of the British and French Governments.
He added that the Polish, British and French Governments had decided to make no démarche in Berlin with regard to Danzig but that Beck might decide to communicate directly with the Danzig Senate. If he should do so he would have the support of both the British and French Governments (Lord Lothian who has just come from England has convinced me that the British Government intends to back the Poles to the limit).
Bonnet said that it was not clear whether the Germans had 10,000 German troops in Danzig or only 6,000. If some night the Germans should land heavy cannon at Danzig in addition to the machine guns and light artillery already there the Poles would be compelled to act; but for the moment the Polish Government was preserving a complete equanimity which was based upon an absolute determination to fight if necessary.
Bonnet said that Marshal Pétain, who was doing an admirable job, was now absolutely convinced that in case of war Spain would remain neutral. He was uncertain, however, whether or not in a disguised manner the Spaniards might not give bases to Italian and German submarines.
With regard to Italy, Bonnet said that Ciano and all other members of the Italian Government at the moment were becoming much more [Page 285] amiable in their conversations with representatives of French Government. His impression was that the people of Italy were deeply reluctant to be dragged into war by Germany and that even Mussolini was beginning to be worried seriously by the prospects. He thought that if Germany should go to war with Poland, Mussolini still would drive Italy into the war but that the Italians would fight with little heart.