740.00/1822: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 29—10:40 a.m.]
1217. I talked with Daladier this evening. He said that he personally was convinced that Hitler intended to make war this summer, would begin war by an attack on Danzig. The information of the French General Staff indicated that Germany would have enough men mobilized to strike at any time after July 15. Some of the reports indicated that the Germans would not strike until about August 15. In any event he felt that some time between July 15 and August 15 a crisis of the gravest sort was inevitable.
He added that he felt Hitler might fear to strike if the negotiations of France and England with the Soviet Union should be concluded successfully before July 15 and if the Neutrality Act in the United States should be altered to permit shipments of arms, munitions and implements of war and if the Germans should become convinced that France and England were absolutely determined to fight by the side of Poland. If any one of these three elements should be missing he thought that Hitler would risk war.
Daladier said that the British were now falling over themselves to accede to the Russian demands. Two texts for submission to the Soviet Government had been prepared today. The first contained no specific mention of the Baltic States, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland but would be accompanied by a secret agreement covering them. The second contained a complete acceptance of the Russian demands. Strang, in Moscow, would be instructed tonight or tomorrow to present these two texts to the Soviet Government and to state that the British and French preferred the first text but were ready to accept the second if the Russians should insist.
I asked Daladier if he believed that this would conclude the negotiations or if he believed the Russians would insist on subjecting this political accord to the conclusion of a future military agreement. He said that he had urged the British to take up the question of military agreement with the Russians before taking up the matter of the political agreement but the British had refused to do this. He was by no means certain that the Russians would surrender this demand and [Page 278] feared that the negotiations might be dragged out indefinitely. The proposal of the British now was that military conversations should begin within a week after the signature of the political agreement.
He added that the Soviet Government had repeatedly assured the French and British Governments that it was not negotiating in any way with the German Government. I expressed doubt, and Daladier said that of course he knew he could not trust any Russian assurances, but that neither the French nor British Embassies nor Secret Services had been able to unearth any information indicating that the Russians were negotiating with the Germans.
Daladier said that in order to convince the Germans that the French support of Poland was certain he had just ordered 42 tanks and a considerable quantity of heavy artillery shipped to Poland. In case Poland and Germany should become involved in war it was absolutely certain that France would declare war on Germany.
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