741.61/632: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:05 p.m.]
979. On Saturday night Daladier, Bonnet, Léger and Halifax discussed at length the negotiations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
Léger stated to me this morning that Halifax had finally agreed to adopt the original French proposal and indeed had expressed willingness to go further than the original French proposal since he was prepared to propose to the Soviet Union the following formula: that in case the Soviet Union should become engaged in war because of an appeal for assistance by either Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland or Rumania in case any one of these states should be attacked by Germany, Great Britain would bring full and immediate military assistance to the Soviet Union. Vice versa in case Great Britain is involved in war because of an attack on one of these states and an appeal to Great Britain for assistance, the Soviet Union would render immediate military assistance to Great Britain.
Léger commented that if the British had been prepared to accept this formula 3 weeks ago the Russians would have accepted it but at the present moment the Soviet Union was insisting that it would not negotiate on any other basis than the full Soviet formula reported in my No. 953 of May 16, 8 p.m.
Léger said that the French Government had received some disquieting information with regard to offers that the German Government was making to the Soviet Government and in view of the urgent need to have full Soviet support for the states of Eastern Europe the French Government had urged the British Government to accept the Soviet proposal in toto.
Halifax had replied that it would be extremely difficult for the Prime Minister to carry public opinion with him to the lengths demanded by the Soviet proposal. In the end, however, he had said that he was convinced personally that if the Russians should refuse to accept the proposal he was now ready to make, the Soviet proposal should be accepted. He did not, however, hold out much hope that Chamberlain would agree with this point of view. Léger added that Maisky was on a very high horse indeed and said he feared that at this late date nothing short of full acceptance of the Soviet proposal would persuade the Soviet Government to participate in the resistance to Germany. The Soviet Government had explained privately to the French Government that it felt so uncertain of the situation in Rumania which might be reversed in one night by the assassination [Page 257] of the King of Rumania that it desired a direct alliance with France and England. The Soviet Government must consider within the bounds of possibility the eventuality that Rumania would not resist German attack and would not call on the Soviet Government for assistance. In that case if German troops should cross Rumania to attack the Soviet Union, Great Britain would not be obliged to assist the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union desired to be confident of British support no matter what might be the future action of the Rumanian Government.