751.65/588: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 11, 1939—12:45 p.m.]
457. Bonnet spent a part of this afternoon with me and I invited Ambassador Kennedy to join us. Before the Ambassador arrived Bonnet said to me that he had sent a note to the British Government today57 replying in extremely stiff terms to the British note referred to in my numbers 401, March 3, and 430, March 8.58
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Bonnet asked Ambassador Kennedy if to his knowledge the Italian Government had presented any demands against France to the British Government. The Ambassador replied that he had discussed this subject with Chamberlain and Halifax and he was certain that the Italians had not presented any concrete demands either to Lord Perth59 or in London. He went on to say that the British attitude today was entirely different from the British attitude in September. He had never believed that the British Government would fight last September. He believed now that the British Government was fully prepared to fight and that Hore-Belisha’s speech60 was of the utmost importance as an indication of British policy.
[Page 33]Chamberlain had told him a week before Belisha’s speech that he had told Belisha to make such a speech although he knew that it would be the most severe blow that the British public had had to receive for years. It would not be easy for the British to swallow the idea that they must send soldiers to France. He considered this speech a positive indication that the British would bring no pressure whatsoever on the French to make concessions to Japan [Italy?].
Bonnet said that he was extremely glad to hear this and the discussion then turned to the problem which would be presented if on the one hand the French and British should go on increasing their defensive strength but not desire war and on the other hand the Germans and Italians should go on increasing their armed strength but be afraid to begin war. Security against attack would increase on both sides but ruin would approach with each gain in security.
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At this point Ambassador Kennedy was obliged to leave for Rome.
Bonnet then said that he had been much surprised to read today a despatch from Washington by Roussy de Sales61 stating that public opinion in the United States would be against a conference for limitation of armaments at the present time and asked me if our Government would be opposed to such a conference.
I replied that the President’s speeches and yours indicated clearly that the United States always would be ready to participate in a conference for the limitation of armaments; but added that in my opinion we would not desire to abandon the program of rearmament which we had just inaugurated.
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In conclusion Bonnet said to me that he could not help reflecting during our conversation on the immense improvement in the situation from the point of view of the democracies since last September. This was due in part to the evolution of public opinion in Great Britain, the progress of the rearmament program in Great Britain and to the greatly improved situation in France, but in major part it was due to the policy which had been followed by the Government of the United States since last October.
- For text of French note dated March 8, 1939, see Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1989, Third Series, vol. iv, doc. No. 365, p. 341.↩
- Neither printed.↩
- British Ambassador in Italy.↩
- Speech by Hore-Belisha, British Secretary of State for War, March 8, 1939, in the British House of Commons; see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 344 (1938–39), p. 2161.↩
- Count Raoul de Roussy de Sales, special correspondent in the United States for the Paris-Soir.↩