760C.62/818: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 15—2:35 p.m.]
1494. Charvériat who is in charge at the Foreign Office stated to me this afternoon that the telegrams received this morning from Berlin and Rome indicated that Hitler was determined to have war with Poland.
[Page 216]A telegram received from Berlin this morning stated that the Italian Ambassador there, Attolico, was intensely depressed because Hitler and Ribbentrop seemed to be determined to have war with Poland whether Mussolini wished it or not.
From both Rome and Berlin the French Government had information to the effect that Hitler and Ribbentrop had talked to Ciano in such a manner that Ciano had been shocked and had refused to make any definite reply to Hitler’s proposals and had not telephoned or reported otherwise to Mussolini but had returned to Rome to report in order to avoid giving answers to the requests of Hitler and Ribbentrop for Italian support in an attack on Poland.
It was the impression of the French Government that Mussolini at the moment was reluctant to support Hitler in an attack on Poland and desired to bring about a conference at which Germany and Italy might present all their demands in all the different international fields. The Italians, however, appeared now to doubt their ability to obtain Hitler’s consent to such a conference or to restrain him from almost immediate action against Poland.
From the French point of view the proposal of such a conference would involve an exceedingly grave decision. Because of the manner in which Hitler had broken the promises which he had made at Munich it was obvious that no confidence could be placed in any future promises of his. As a preliminary to any such conference it seemed essential that the French and British should demand the carrying out of the promises made at Munich which would involve the evacuation by German troops of the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.
The telegrams this morning from Berlin indicated that the responsible officials of the German Government were now talking about Poland in a manner which indicated that the Germans would insist not only upon the acquisition of Danzig but also the annexation of the Corridor and of Polish Upper Silesia. Danzig still remained the probable point at which the Germans would strike the spark that would set fire to Europe; but the most responsible German officials were now talking about the necessity of entering Poland to protect the Germans resident in Poland. It might be that this sort of talk was merely intended to produce terror in Poland but it might also be that Hitler had decided to strike and that he was fanning German feeling to a greater head. The German mobilization was continuing without interruption.
Charvériat expressed the same opinion which Daladier expressed to me a few days ago, to wit: that the only hope of preserving peace lay in convincing Hitler that an attack on Poland would involve immediate [Page 217] declarations of war by France and England. The nub of the question was that it was not Danzig’s freedom but Poland’s which was at stake. Charvériat said that reports thus far received from Moscow indicated that the Russian military men desired to get on with the business of the military pact rapidly; but he added that up to date the negotiators had not yet touched the heart of the question.
Charvériat concluded by saying that it was his conviction that the Germans might provoke an incident in any 24 hours that might start general war.