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The Ambassador in Poland ( Biddle ) to the Secretary of State

No. 979

Sir: Now that the spotlight of political attention is focussed on Warsaw as a center for diplomatic “shopping tours” by the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Italy and Rumania, and since Minister Beck has just given a favorable response to the British Embassy’s soundings as to his attitude towards an early visit to London, (now tentatively scheduled for first week in April), I have the honor to report, as of possible interest, my following observations regarding Polish officialdom’s attitude concerning the current trend of European affairs:

Accordingly, the following substance of Beck’s recent confidential remarks to me, affords in my opinion, an insight to Beck’s present reaction to events current and their potential bearing on those apparently in-the-making.

Beck reminded me that during the tense period leading up to the Munich Conference, he had imparted his belief Chamberlain was bluffing; at the very moment he was taking emergency measures and whipping up a war psychosis among his people, Chamberlain had full intention of trading instead of fighting it out with Hitler. Moreover, [Page 27] Beck reminded me he had said at that time that this was a risky procedure in connection both with British public psychology and confidence on part of statesmen abroad, in terms of the long-range outlook. It might prove expensive to Chamberlain in any future crisis. If and when another crisis arose, the British people would not be apt to forget their last experience. What was more, in view thereof, and until he adopted serious measures to build up a first class army, Chamberlain would have difficulty in exacting advance commitments from statesmen of foreign countries who, once “bitten”, would hardly allow themselves to be used as potential instruments in what might possibly develop into a game of international bluff, for fear of subsequently falling victims of the vindictiveness of the Dictators.

Having recalled to mind the foregoing, Beck then significantly remarked he continued to feel of the same opinion: that in view of pre-Munich events, Chamberlain might conceivably find not only his own people but also the Governments of other states wary of Chamberlain’s underlying intentions in the event Britain and/or France came to a show-down with Berlin and/or Rome.

I consider the foregoing significant, in that to my mind, it portrays what is in the back of the Polish official mind today, when appraising the nearby turn of events. In other words, I am of the opinion the Polish Government will seek to avoid the possibility of finding itself “out on a limb”, in terms of commitments, not only to the Axis powers but also to the Western Powers, possibly only later to be let down, and left to the vindictiveness of either or both ends of the Axis in event of a potential deal between the latter and London and Paris. Indeed, persistent reports from confidential sources abroad, to the effect that there is an underlying tendency amongst important elements in official circles both in Paris and London to compromise the Italo-French differences as well as Germany’s colonial claims, have made a marked impression on Government circles here.

On the other hand, I am aware that Beck and his associates in Government and military circles here greeted the firm attitude manifested by President Roosevelt and his Government associates, together with our sale of planes to France and Britain and our Government’s armament program, as “music to their ears”. Moreover, they felt that altogether this had stiffened the Western European democracies, and had chased the dictators to cover, to reexamining their respective and joint positions. They are sincerely hopeful that recent signs of stiffening on part of the European democracies will continue, and that the dictators will at least for a while, continue to modulate the tone of their former boisterousness. Moreover, it is well to bear in mind that fundamentally Beck realizes that in event of an inter-Axes conflict, [Page 28] Poland’s only “out” from eventual German aggression and potential hegemony, would be Poland’s participation on the side of a victorious democratic front. Meanwhile, however, due to the aforecited circumstances, and Poland’s delicate geo-political position, Poland will “wait and see”.

In other words, and in terms of the immediate future, I look for Beck to pursue an “I’m from Missouri” policy vis-à-vis the Western European Powers, coupled with a “wait and see” policy vis-à-vis developments between the Rome–Berlin and London–Paris Axes.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.