760d.61/890: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 31—6:20 p.m.]
1164. Department’s telegram No. 327, December 29, 6 p.m.33 I have no evidence which would justify the opinion that the present time is propitious to approach the Soviet Government for the purpose of bringing about negotiations with the Finnish Government nor is there as yet any sign of a desire on the part of the Soviet Government to extricate itself from the difficulties which it has encountered in the prosecution of the war with Finland. As I have indicated in my telegrams I believe that the Soviet Government has committed itself so publicly and definitely to a course which involves the conquest of Finland that only the fear of serious internal complications or of menace from abroad will induce Stalin to accept the loss of prestige which would attend negotiations with the present Finnish Government.
Up to the present the internal difficulties which may in part be due to the added strain of the military operations in Finland appear to constitute little more than an intensification of the normal defects of Soviet economy. They are not as yet, insofar as I am able to ascertain, sufficiently serious to cause a modification of Soviet policies in regard to Finland. The reverses which the Soviet Army has thus far sustained in Finland are unquestionably causing concern to the Soviet Government but every indication points to the intention to continue offensive military operations. I regard as substantial proof of the [Page 1039] foregoing the exchange of telegrams between Kuusinen and Stalin on the occasion of the latter’s 60th birthday34 particularly Stalin’s personal commitment in his reply to Kuusinen of December 23 in which he referred to a “speedy and complete” victory over the present Finnish Government and which can only be interpreted as disclosing his intention to pursue the Finnish venture.
Should there be any developments in Soviet internal conditions or in the international situation of the Soviet Union which would justify the belief that the Soviet Government might be willing to entertain an offer of mediation by a third country, in my opinion that would be the time in the light of the then existing situation to examine the best method of approach. I consider, however, that should such an occasion present itself a general démarche by a number of powers would be a most ineffective method of approach. Furthermore, I am convinced that any attempt to associate Germany with such a démarche or even make an informal approach through that country would be extremely injudicious. In the first place I doubt that Germany would be willing to take part in any such démarche and secondly any effort to include Germany would almost certainly be viewed by the Kremlin as an attempt to drive a wedge between Germany and the Soviet Union. I also believe that any approach even at the appropriate time would be impolitic if it were thought by the Soviet that the initiative had come from Sweden by reason of the fact that the traditional animosity between Sweden and Russia has been accentuated by the not disinterested activities of Sweden on behalf of Finland. If and when the situation appears propitious it may well be that an informal strictly confidential approach by the United States alone would offer the best chance of success.
I shall continue to watch closely for and report to the Department the slightest indication which in my opinion would support the conclusion that the Soviet Government might be willing even to consider a suggestion looking toward the termination of hostilities with Finland.
- Not printed; the Department instructed the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to report any information regarding Soviet internal conditions that might make it possible for another démarche to be entertained for suspending hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union and entering upon peace conversations (760d.61/878).↩
- Born December 21, 1879.↩