741.60c/65: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 10—9:44 a.m.]
687. The Polish Ambassador, who traveled as far as Brussels with Beck, asked to see me urgently as soon as he returned to Paris.
[Page 121]He said that Beck had asked him to say to me that the shortness of the period that I was on his train had made it impossible to explain his views to me in as detailed a manner as he had wished.
Beck had been embarrassed by my questions with regard to the obligation of Poland to go to the assistance of England in case of a German attack on Holland, Belgium or Switzerland, for the simple reason that his plenipotentiary powers gave him the right to agree to an alliance in case of direct attack on Great Britain but not in case of an indirect attack. He had been obliged therefore when in England to take the personal responsibility for saying that he was certain that his Government would agree to fight in case Great Britain should judge an attack against the Netherlands, Belgium or Switzerland, to be an attack against the vital interests of Great Britain. He had not wished to make any statement to any one on this subject until he had seen Moscicki and Smigly-Rydz and had received full authority to make this premise officially on behalf of the Polish Government.
The Polish Ambassador added that Beck was certain that the Polish Government would approve his action and would promise officially and at once to go to war on the side of Great Britain in case of any conflict which Great Britain judged should menace its vital interests.
The Polish Ambassador said that Beck also wanted him to explain further to me his thoughts with regard to Rumania. When the Rumanian Minister in London had called on him he had asked the Rumanian Minister flatly for an explanation of the Rumanian Government’s request to the Governments of France and England to arrange for Rumania a defensive alliance with Poland directed against Hungary and Germany. The Rumanian Minister had replied evasively and had said that his Government had given him no explanation of its failure to approach Poland directly. Beck’s own opinion was that the démarche which he had made in Budapest in which he had indicated that if Hungary should attack Rumania, Poland would be obliged to assist Rumania, to which the Hungarian Government had replied in most reassuring terms that Hungary had no intention whatsoever of attacking Rumania, had convinced the Rumanians that they were today enjoying all the benefits of an alliance with Poland without any of the burdens. If the Rumanians should ask Poland for a defensive alliance against Hungary and Germany the Poles certainly would ask Rumania to agree to go to war in case of a German attack on Poland. Beck felt therefore that the reason why the Rumanians had not approached Poland directly was because they desired to avoid giving any promise to go to war at once on the side of Poland in case of a German attack on Poland.
The Polish Ambassador was extremely depressed and apprehensive with regard to the entire situation. He said that his most recent information [Page 122] indicated that there were German troop movements which might be interpreted as preparation for an immediate German attack on Poland. The position of Poland if war should not break out at once would be greatly strengthened by the British-Polish alliance but if war should break out at once no real assistance from England could be given. The British had no army and Poland would be cut off from British supplies. The Polish Army was in desperate need of airplanes, tanks and heavy artillery.
Beck had instructed him to see Bonnet yesterday and he had done so. He had requested the shipment immediately of military supplies from France to Poland and especially airplanes. I said to him that he must know that France had so few airplanes today that it would be impossible to send any to Poland. He said that unfortunately this was true. He hoped however that a similar request which his colleague in London had made to the British Government might result in the shipment of planes to Poland.
The Polish Ambassador said that Beck had instructed him to say to Bonnet also that he felt it was time for the Polish-French alliance to be placed on the same basis as the British-Polish alliance, that is to say each country should be the sole judge of the moment when its vital interests were attacked and declarations of war should be automatic. The Polish Ambassador went on to say that unless the French Army could retain on the French frontier at least two-thirds of the German Army the position of Poland would be hopeless. I called his attention to the fact that the highest military circles here estimate that the Germans on the Siegfried line could hold up the entire French Army with one-third of the German Army. The Polish Ambassador said that he feared this was true; therefore the position of Holland, Belgium and Switzerland would become most important.
Unless the French Army should be able to attack Germany by way of Belgium it would be possible for Germany to throw an overwhelming mass of troops against Poland.
The Polish Ambassador asked me if it might not be possible for Poland to obtain financial help and aeroplanes from the United States. I replied that I believed that the Johnson Act88 would forbid any loans from the United States to Poland but added that it might be possible for England to purchase planes for cash in the United States and turn them over to Poland.
Lukasiewicz, throughout our conversation, was laboring under the burden of the thought that within a very few weeks his country might be removed from the map of Europe by German invasion.
- Approved April 13, 1934; 48 Stat. 574.↩