760d.61/355: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Sterling) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:15 p.m.]
168. Sandler asked me to see him this afternoon. He stated that the Finnish-Russian negotiations were in a most serious stage. He recalled that in our last interview (Legation’s 158, October 20, 11 a.m.) he had mentioned that the Russian demands not only infringed upon Finland’s sovereignty and integrity but impaired her political independence. He stated that the revised demands still infringe upon her integrity and sovereignty and while they do not directly affect Finland’s independence or assume the position of neutrality, such as would follow from a mutual assistance pact, they did so indirectly by including Hango on the mainland as a military and naval base, perhaps as an air base. This if granted would in effect result in the loss of Finland’s political independence. Not only that but the cession of Hango would entirely change the situation in the Baltic and would be a direct danger to Sweden. Russia’s plans in the event [Page 982] of Finland’s rejection of the demands are an unknown quantity but should Russia attempt to enforce them by an invasion of Finland, Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries would consider very seriously giving military aid to Finland. He said that in all probability the Department had knowledge of the full demands through our Legation in Helsinki but if not he believed they could be obtained from the Finnish Minister at Washington.
With this preliminary statement Sandler asked very earnestly if President Roosevelt would not make another approach immediately to Moscow. He said “immediately” because the Finnish delegation has planned to leave Helsinki for Moscow on Saturday (tomorrow) evening with the final limit of cessions to Russia and it was felt that Moscow would probably reject them when presented. He pointed out that one reason for the absolute secrecy surrounding the negotiations was to enable the Soviet Government to modify the demands without loss of face. If President Roosevelt’s appeal was communicated to Russia before the arrival of Finnish delegates there was still some hope that the demands would be modified. A salient point he stated in the exchange of notes between President Roosevelt and President Kalinin was that the latter did not mention in his reply the treaty of nonaggression between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Finland of January 22 [21], 193258 and its subsequent prolongation of April 7, 193459 whereby the existing frontiers were guaranteed and upon which Finland was largely basing her resistance.
Sandler asked if the President’s decision could be cabled to me at once and given to him confidentially so that in the event that the decision was in the affirmative he could advise the Finnish delegation to delay their departure in order to arrive in Moscow after the President’s communication. He said that he was taking this initiative with the knowledge of Finland. He added that no replies had yet been received to the identic notes of October 12 from the Scandinavian powers to the Soviet Government.