741.60c/64: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 8—11:10 a.m.]
678. I rode with Beck from Calais to Lille today. He was immensely pleased and flattered by his reception in England and repeated modestly that the British had been very “elegant elegant” in their attitude toward him.
Beck said that the discussions that he had had in London had been so detailed and exhaustive that he felt there was now complete understanding [Page 118] between the British and Polish Governments and that future collaboration between those countries would be easy and confident. It is difficult to exaggerate the impression that his reception by the British made on Beck. He was as pleased as a climber who for the first time has met a lord, and I feel that, at least for the present, British influence in Poland will be very great.
Beck said he knew that Hitler and all the other German leaders were furious with him. He had no exact idea what Hitler would do. Ribbentrop he considered a “dangerous imbecile”. Ribbentrop unfortunately had acquired the complete confidence of Hitler because last September he had taken the position that in the end neither the Czechs nor the British nor the French would fight whereas almost all other advisers of Hitler had taken the position that the British, French and Czechs would fight.
Beck said he believed that Ribbentrop had been urging Hitler to take a menacing attitude toward Poland. It should be obvious now to Hitler that threats to Poland would get Germany nowhere. There was an area of negotiation which had definite frontiers. Within these frontiers Poland could negotiate but if Germany should step across one of them it would mean war and now Hitler should understand that.
Beck added that I should not be surprised if within the next 3 or 4 days he should receive with every appearance of amity the gentleman he had just described as a “dangerous imbecile.” He would rather negotiate with Germany than fight Germany. He called my attention to the fact that up to date Hitler had taken no action against a strong state that was courageous enough to defend itself. He did not believe that in the end Hitler would decide to attack Poland.
Beck said that Halifax, Chamberlain and some of the other men in the British Foreign Office had attempted to persuade him to form at once a military alliance with Rumania to take effect in case of an attack on Rumania by Germany or Hungary.
He had refused flatly to do this for two reasons. In the first place although the Rumanians had asked the British and French to persuade the Poles to accord them such an alliance they had never asked Poland directly to make such an alliance. I asked Beck whether if Rumania should request such an alliance directly, he would accord it. He replied that he would discuss the matter but added that he felt that conclusion of an alliance between Poland and Rumania so long as Rumania and Hungary should remain unreconciled would thrust Hungary instantly into the hands of Germany. This was his second reason for refusing to sign an alliance with Rumania directed against Germany and Hungary. So long as there was one chance in a hundred of keeping Hungary out of the hands of Germany he would continue to struggle to keep Hungary out of German hands. He still [Page 119] had hopes that he might be able to work out a reconciliation between Rumania and Hungary, and that the two states in close collaboration with Poland might form a real barrier to German advance.
Beck insisted that Halifax and Chamberlain understood fully his policy vis-à-vis Rumania and Hungary and approved it heartily.
I asked Beck whether if Germany should attack the Netherlands, Belgium or Switzerland, and Great Britain should enter war on that account Poland would march. He replied that the answer was to be found in the statement made by Lord Plymouth86 in the House of Lords in which he had indicated that Poland was to be the sole judge of the question of whether or not her vital interests were involved. Great Britain likewise could judge in any given case whether or not her vital interests were involved and Poland would be faithful to her promises.
Beck said that he did not believe that Yugoslavia would give any support to Albania. He felt that Daladier’s87 recent speech dealing with Italy’s claims had been a mistake. Mussolini before that speech had in his opinion been ready to draw away from Germany and Daladier had eliminated this possibility. I replied that I do not agree in the least as I felt certain there was no chance of breaking the Rome–Berlin Axis at the present time.
In connection with our discussion of this question and others I derived the impression that Beck is still most hostile toward France. His attitude in alluding to all French leaders is one of contemptuous superiority.
In conclusion Beck said with intense emphasis that he had made it clear to the British, who understood and approved entirely, that he was no more ready today than he had ever been to make Poland an instrument of either German or Russian policy. He believed that there was a chance still of preserving peace. Collective security had ceased to mean anything. Peace could only be preserved if every step from now on should be based on the real strength of nations which were ready to fight. His impression [of] Hitler, whom he had seen many times, was that at bottom the Fuehrer was a timid Austrian who would not risk war against determined and strong opponents.
[On April 8, 1939, the British Ambassador confidentially supplied the Secretary of State with copies of the summary of conclusions reached during the conversations held in London, April 4 to April 6, between the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (740.00/1533). It was requested [Page 120] that the document be forwarded to the President. For text, see Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, volume V, page 47.]