393.1115/3839
Memorandum by the Consul at Hankow (Jarvis), on Leave in the United States
It was the opinion of the German military advisers, when they left Hankow at the beginning of July, that the Chinese should be able to hold the city until the 1st of October. It now looks as if the Chinese will do better than that, but though opinions differ as to the probable date of Hankow’s fall there is general agreement that the Japanese must and will take Hankow, as long as China resists.
2. When Hankow does fall, will the occupation be a repetition of what happened at Nanking or a peaceful turnover as at Tsingtao? The answer lies primarily with the Japanese and Chinese but the determining factor may be the attitude of the foreign powers, especially the United States. It is widely accepted in China that what occurred at Nanking and many other places taken by the Japanese is only the usual Japanese way of treating captured towns and that the brutalities which have so shocked foreigners are not the result [Page 479] of lax discipline but that license to loot, rape and kill is the normal reward, in this war at all events, of successful Japanese troops, as it has been in the past in other armies. Many observers expect the Japanese to behave no better at Hankow than they did at Nanking, unless some restraint can be put upon them, and that the more stubbornly the Chinese resist and the longer they delay Hankow’s capture the worse the Japanese will behave when they finally reach it.
3. At one time it was planned that the Chinese troops as they retired before the Japanese would not pass through but would be diverted around Hankow, where meanwhile the local garrison, commanded by a Hupeh general liked and trusted by the foreign community, would maintain order as long as possible and withdraw before the Japanese arrived. Before I left there were signs that this plan might be discarded in favor of one that boded ill for Hankow: the Communists were said to be pressing for a strong stand at Hankow, the new Hupeh Governor (replacing the general mentioned above) was talking of arming the civil population, and there were hints that the “scorched earth” policy, which has strong advocates in the Chinese high command and which might, for example, involve the wrecking of the Japanese Concession, might be applied at Hankow. Foreigners, while hoping for the best were preparing for the worst, which they envisaged as a combined Japanese attack by air, land and river, overwhelming Chinese resistance and filling the city with fleeing Chinese troops with the Japanese in hot pursuit and bloody encounters in the streets and on the Bund. If, however, the Japanese prefer to take Hankow by enveloping it rather than by direct assault, the Chinese may make a timely withdrawal, as they did at Hsuchow, and the occupation may meet no organized resistance.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17. At Nanking under appallingly difficult circumstances and without official support, and at many towns in the interior, small groups of devoted missionaries, cut off from contact with the outside world, have been able to safeguard much of their missions’ property, to save thousands of innocent Chinese from violence and death, and to exert a restraining influence on the occupation. At Hankow, with its French Concession, its partly British-administered S. A. D. 3, its large foreign interests and extensive foreign properties, its foreign consulates, and its foreign warships, conditions are not less favorable for the maintenance of foreign rights, the protection of foreign interests, the curbing of barbarism, and the performance of a great humanitarian work.
18. I venture to hope that the American Government will (1) make strong representations to the Japanese and Chinese Governments (a) for the protection of our citizens, property and interests at Hankow [Page 480] and (b) for the establishment and observance of the safety zones proposed by the Committee; (2) remind Tokyo of her repeated promises to respect our rights and her frequent disclaimers of animus against the Chinese people and warn her that we regard Hankow as a test of her good faith in both respects; and (3) see that our efforts, and what happens at Hankow, receive full publicity.
19. A firm stand in assertion of our rights and the rights of non-combatants should do good not only at Hankow but wherever in the Far East those rights may be threatened; it should also strengthen the hands of France and Great Britain in Europe. The risks are no greater than those incurred by weakness.
Note. The writer (now in the United States on leave) left Hankow July 14, 1938. From their formation until his departure he was Secretary of the Foreign Transportation Committee and consular representative on the Foreign Residents Association. He was in close touch with the Safety Zones Committee.