393.1115/3369: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Lockhart)

433. Associated Press dispatches dated Shanghai, July 9, state that Japanese authorities have sent memoranda to diplomatic representatives of neutral powers warning that neutral vessels and nationals along an 80-mile stretch on the Yangtze are endangered by spreading warfare, and stressing “the desirability of voluntary evacuation” along the Yangtze between Pukow and Wangshikong, and that the area outlined includes Kiukiang and Kuling.

On July 7 Department telegraphed Hankow as follows:

“Your 341, July 7, 10 a.m., and previous. Department hopes that in the light of Commander-in-Chief’s 0012–133512 and Monocacy’s 1006–151513 Monocacy will promptly fix and give notice of intended date of departure from Kiukiang and in due course withdraw from area where hostilities are impending. Please keep Department promptly informed.”

Department realizes that it is impossible for us here to judge the details and have the “feel” of the situation with the degree of qualification for deciding what steps should be taken from moment to moment that are possible to officers on the spot. However, we feel that Commander-in-Chief’s 0012–1335 constitutes a very sound guide to procedure which should be followed. All officers who have to make decisions should understand clearly that this Government earnestly desires that unnecessary risks be not taken and chance of there occurring another Panay incident be avoided just as far as possible. In the light of telegrams from Hankow, Department assumes that few if any of the American nationals now at Kiukiang and/or Kuling will be willing to board the Monocacy. It cannot be expected that Monocacy will send out landing parties. Would not giving by the Monocacy of notice of intended departure, with offer of transportation, lead to embarkation by such American nationals as are willing to leave? Would any further standing by of the Monocacy serve any useful purpose in regard to those not willing to leave? Would not the situation locally and the national interests of the United States and the policy which this Government is following be best served by the procedure indicated in Department’s telegram to Shanghai of July 7 quoted above?

Department offers no opinion as to substance of reply that diplomatic representatives of the powers should make to the new Japanese warning, if given as stated in the Associated Press story mentioned [Page 399] above. However, Department hopes that all American authorities concerned will in conferring with the authorities of other powers, and in making reply, have constantly in mind that this Government is endeavoring to pursue a course which takes full cognizance of the fact that hostilities are in progress and that where such is the case absolute immunity from danger or harm cannot be guaranteed to and is likely not to be afforded to other persons and property either by the combatants or by their own Governments. On this basis, while we assent to no impairment of our rights, we feel that all efforts made in defense of these rights should be in accordance with principles of reason and of proportion as outlined in various public statements of the Secretary of State.

Please bring the whole of the above immediately and informally to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief.

Repeat to Hankow.

Hull
  1. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 600.
  2. See telegram No. 0006 of July 6, 3:15 p.m., from the Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, p. 153.