811.30 Asiatic Fleet/564
The Navy Department to the Department of State
The following information has been received from the U. S. S. Monocacy (Sept. 2, 1938):
Was informed today secret operations completed now possible for us obtain coal Andersen Meyer. Japs requested dates desired same, informed them would notiry SNO37 first day and take fuel every three days as specified my original letter. This latter necessary due small capacity only available lighter.
The following information has been received from U. S. S. Oahu under date of September 2, 1938:
This morning relayed your (CinCAF)38 message of yesterday through Commander Takata and Mr. Mizota. The Japanese Admiral is anxious that you more fully understand his position and states therefore that he is impelled to disclose information most of which he considers most secret and requests precautions be taken to prevent leaks to Chinese or third powers. Have swept only narrow channel between Wuhu and point 15 miles above Kiukiang, more than 700 mines destroyed and numerous casualties sustained by their ships; Rear Admiral Sonoda is now in charge of sweeping operations, on 31 August will commence new sweeping operations from Wuhu up, but will not even reach Anking by 10 September. Below Kiukiang and at [Page 181] 6 locations pointed out on charts Chinese detached units very active, necessary above Wuhu that all ships proceed in convoys with destroyer escort, all convoys subject sniping and indirect fire of Chinese field and heavy artillery located inland from river. Congestion in river caused by operation of hundreds of large ships and thousands of small craft above Wuhu, presents serious problem which would be complicated by passage even small gunboat. In addition, passage down of Monocacy would undoubtedly be followed by similar British demands for Cockchafer39 and passage up of reliefs and ships of other third powers and proportionately increase difficulties; states his belief Japanese foreign office has never questioned fundamental right third powers to free navigation of Yangtze but Jap navy does claim control passage through barriers by virtue their capture and military nature. Present objections hinge on military and naval operations and expediency; states belief British have recognized validity Japanese objections, Jap navy transporting mail and several months supply of provisions to Kiukiang for Cockchafer; his offer of naval plane service transportation relief personnel Monocacy and surface transportation provisions, fuel and mail re-affirmed.
Re: Monocacy attempt obtain coal from Andersen Meyer’s, it is a matter of extreme regret to him that he was ignorant of this until yesterday. Military refusal based on fear of disclosure Japanese efforts to recondition former Chinese air field near that plant for their own use. Even though field not visible from company plant, operations connected therewith are. Military commander instructed to permit U. S. S. Monocacy access to this coal if again requested.
Re: Mine explosion near Monocacy Jap belief that mine exploded by rifle fire from Cockchafer since sweep which discovered this mine had left for further instructions from Sonoda, in view its too close proximity Monocacy misinterpretation placed on this incident by newspapers, pointed out as type of thing they most anxious to avoid and what would most likely happen if the Monocacy was allowed to steam down river. Admiral Oikawa therefore again requests that Admiral Yarnell permit Monocacy remain Kiukiang until such time as present objections no longer obtained.
Comdr. Takata and Mr. Mizota request that unless it is desired to have Admiral Oikawa personally present that arrangements be made to conduct future interviews at Jap naval headquarters in Shanghai or some other mutually agreeable meeting place in that city because of greater convenience; they both propose to return to Shanghai tomorrow morning.
The following has been received from CinCAF (Sept. 3, 1938) (addressed to U. S. S. Oahu):
Give my regards and thanks to Admiral Oikawa for courtesies and frankness of his confidence which will be respected and also convey to him my regrets that he has been unable to assist in the passage of the Monocacy down the river at the present also tell him that in view of his consideration and friendly attitude I am willing to accede to his wishes and hold the U. S. S. Monocacy at Kiukiang for the time being.
Following from CinCAF to Navy Dep[artmen]t:
As the situation regarding provisions is becoming acute will unless otherwise directed by Navy Department accept the Japanese offer to transport mail, supplies and maybe personnel in as much as there are no other sources available; doubt the advisability of further insistence at the present time of moving U. S. S. Monocacy.