500.A15A5 Construction/163
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
With reference to the “escalator” discussions now proceeding in London under Article 25 of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom regard it as most important to reach agreement on new limitations with as little delay as possible. They understand, however, that the United States Government are in some doubt as to whether any new limits should be fixed. Under Article 25 (3) of the 1936 Treaty the interested Powers are bound to endeavour to reach agreement on new limits for sub-category (a) Capital Ships, and it was clearly the intention of the Treaty that there should be new limits if possible. In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government it is most important for political and other reasons that some limit should be fixed now, and it seems to them desirable, while avoiding any excessive increase, to fix a limit at such a level that reescalation is unlikely to be required again in the Capital Ships category during the period of the Treaty. The basis of the 1936 Treaty is a system of qualitative limitation to which the interested Powers were committed by the conclusion of the Treaty with the full knowledge that Japan would not be a signatory. This system, as the United States Government will be aware, dates from the Washington Conference of 1922, and his Majesty’s Government cannot believe that any Treaty Power would depart from it except in circumstances of the most undoubted gravity. His Majesty’s Government believe that the exigencies of the present situation can be fully met without abandoning the principle of an upper limit for Capital Ships. The [Page 910] position of His Majesty’s Government is complicated by the fact that Germany and Soviet Russia, with whom they have bilateral agreements, will be pressing for information as to the British attitude in view of their own building programmes. The period of uncertainty is bound, His Majesty’s Government feel, to give rise to anxiety amongst other powers.
With particular regard to the risk that if new limits are fixed the Japanese Government might proceed to build over such limits, His Majesty’s Government consider such action unlikely and one that could in any case be met by fresh escalation.
On the other hand the absence of limits in regard to building programmes and a policy of secrecy are, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, even more likely to cause the Japanese Government, in order to avoid any risk, to build to a higher limit than they otherwise would. In actual fact it would no doubt prove difficult for His Majesty’s Government, as also perhaps for the United States Government, to maintain complete secrecy regarding the size of their new ships, and in the view of His Majesty’s Government there would, therefore, be no permanent advantage in adopting an attitude of secrecy. The Japanese Government, on the other hand, are better placed for this purpose, and it is they who, so to speak, keep the Treaty Powers guessing.
In explaining as above the position of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in regard to this issue, it is desired at the same time to stress the great importance which they attach to it. His Majesty’s Government are, moreover, fully prepared to discuss figures as soon as the United States representatives in London are ready to do so. They would therefore welcome at the earliest possible moment a full expression of the views of the United States Government which they venture to suggest might best be facilitated by the despatch to London of a fully accredited expert from the United States Navy Department for the period of the “escalator” discussions. If such an officer were sent it would of course be made clear to the public that his mission was for this purpose only.