741.65/489: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 10—6:50 p.m.]
56. My telegram No. 49, March 8, 1 p.m. The following account of Perth’s conversation with Ciano on March 8 has been given the Embassy in strict confidence.
The British Ambassador read to Ciano a memorandum outlining the various points mentioned in my telegram under reference and was informed in reply that the Italian Government for the present had no other questions to add to the agenda but would reserve its right to do so subsequently. Ciano promised to refer the points raised to the Duce and it was agreed that the conversation should be considered as having a purely preliminary character.
[Page 142]The principal questions which apparently may give rise to certain difficulties are: (1) the extension of the Mediterranean agreement to other powers and (2) the Spanish question.
With respect to the first, if the pact is to be open to accession, by means of a unilateral declaration, of the other Mediterranean powers the question will arise as to the inclusion of Spain. Any Mediterranean pact without Spain would seem in Italian opinion incomplete; and Italy would not apparently be willing to accept the adherence of both Spanish Governments while on the other hand Great Britain would not be prepared to exclude the Republican Government.
While Ciano expressed considerable disappointment over the necessity of the delay in recognition by Great Britain of the Italian conquest in Abyssinia he seemed to attach more importance to the Spanish question and remarked that “a settlement of the Spanish question might postpone the conclusion of the agreement beyond the May Council.” Ciano asked the British Ambassador to determine what the British Government required as evidence that satisfactory progress had been made in Spain. He pointed out that in the matter of withdrawal from the Balearic Islands there were no Italian land forces there but only a certain number of Italian airplanes with some Italian and some Spanish pilots. He thought that it might be difficult to do anything about this since the question of airplanes had not been raised at the London Committee, but promised to look into the matter. He also wished to know whether the conclusion of an Anglo-Italian agreement was dependent upon the practical application of the British formula for the withdrawal of volunteers which had been agreed to by the Italian Government as the preliminary to begin the conversation and if so exactly what was meant by “practical application”. In this connection Ciano gave formal assurances that Italy had every intention of loyally implementing its acceptance of the British formula. It was thereupon agreed that the British Ambassador would seek further instructions on these points the solution of which would remove the greatest obstacle to the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations.
In discussing the question of propaganda Ciano pointed out that the anti-British propaganda in the Italian press had practically ceased; that such propaganda was a consequence and not a cause of Anglo-Italian difficulties and that it could easily be handled if an agreement were reached.
In the matter of Italy’s adherence to the London Naval Treaty Ciano gave the impression that provided other matters were settled this subject would present no practical difficulties.
The British Ambassador informs me that Ciano spoke with the greatest possible earnestness to the effect that the Anglo-Italian settlement would be the greatest step toward peace in Europe which [Page 143] could be taken at the present time; and from other sources it appears that the Italian Government is most anxious to conclude an agreement as early as possible—possibly before Hitler’s arrival in May.