500.A15A5 Construction/128
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)
There are two points of view with regard to escalation:
One held by the Navy, the other advocated strongly by Norman Davis.11
[Page 896]I. The first point of difference is as to whether we should try and negotiate a joint escalation with the British and if possible the French, or whether we should escalate unilaterally.
The Navy prefers to escalate unilaterally because:
(a) In this way we are perfectly certain of complete independence without outside agreements to provide for our national defense as we see fit.
Norman Davis, on the other hand, favors simultaneous escalation on the following grounds:
- (a)
- Having approached the Japanese simultaneously with the British, having received the Japanese answer simultaneously, we should draw the same conclusions and escalate simultaneously. Otherwise we would be out on a limb vis-à-vis Japan.
- (b)
- Psychologically, he felt that it would be a mistake for us to take the initiative in destroying a type of naval limitation for which historically we had a distinct paternity.
- (c)
- If we escalated unilaterally and in all categories of ships and their armament, it would make the future negotiation of a disarmament treaty infinitely more difficult. Mr. Davis believes that ultimately the world will have to come to disarmament and that we should not prejudice the possibility of success along these lines.
II. The second point where there is a difference between the Navy and Mr. Davis is that the latter only wishes to escalate now for such types as we are actually going to build beyond existing treaty limits. The Navy wishes to escalate for all types and then inform the British that it is not our present intention to build in excess of treaty limitations except in the capital ship class.
III. The third point of difference between the Navy and Mr. Davis is that the Navy evidently wish to escalate under Article 25, which reads:
“In the event of any vessel not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions as to standard displacement and armament … being authorized, constructed or acquired by a Power not a party to the present Treaty,” etc.
Mr. Davis thought we could not certify that such types have in fact been authorized, constructed or acquired by Japan and that we should therefore escalate under Article 26 which reads:
“If the requirements of the national security of any high contracting party should be materially affected by any change of circumstances, et cetera.”
It is noted that escalation under Article 26 applies for the current year to annual building programs while under Article 25 the qualitative limits would be lifted from the Treaty for its duration.
- Mr. Davis had been Chairman of the American delegation at the London Naval Conference; see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. i, pp. 22 ff.↩