Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, General, Volume I

500.A15A5 Construction/113

Memorandum by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of European Affairs

[Washington,] February 14, 1938.

The reply, dated February 12, 1938,² of the Japanese to our note of February 5,³ querying them with regard to reported construction in naval vessels in excess of the limits provided in the London Naval Treaty, 1936,⁴ neither furnishes the information requested nor establishes a concrete basis for naval discussion with them. The Japanese state that they “cannot but consider that the discussion suggested by your government would not conduce in any measure to the realization of their desires concerning disarmament.”

Accordingly, under provisions of the naval treaty, the next step will be consultation with the other Parties to the London Treaty—that is, Great Britain and Dominions, and France—to determine whether there should be escalation and, if it is decided to escalate, the degree of escalation.

Escalation may take place under either Article 25 or Article 26 of the London Naval Treaty, or both. The basis for escalation under Article 25 is the authorization, construction or acquisition by a power not a party to the treaty of a vessel not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions as to standard displacement and armament provided by Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the treaty.

The basis for escalation under Article 26 is a change of circumstance materially affecting the national security of a high contracting party.

Evidently, since the exact nature of construction by Japan has not been established without question, there is a definite advantage in proceeding under Article 26, citing the refusal of Japan to furnish information with regard to its naval construction as a circumstance materially affecting national security.

In any event, one party to the treaty must notify that it is its intention to escalate, specifically to depart for the current year from the annual program of construction. We could take this initiative but there is a decided advantage in waiting on the British who will thus give the lead to greater naval construction.

Thereafter, under the provisions of the treaty, the “High Contracting Parties shall consult together” with a view—Article 26—to agreement as to whether any departures are necessary in order to meet the situation or—Article 25—with a view to reducing to a minimum the extent of the departures to be made.

It will be seen that in this consultation there will be scope for considerable negotiation. It is imperative therefore, that in advance of consultation this Government should have clearly in mind what it proposes to suggest and the extent to which it will escalate. This Department, which will have the immediate responsibility of the consultation, should have a specific indication from the Navy Department of its desiderata in this respect.

2. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 304.
3. Ibid., p. 303.
4. Department of State Treaty Series No. 919, or 50 Stat. 1363.