741.00/153: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

131. My 128, February 14.9 A Foreign Office official gave me last night in strict confidence certain clarifying information with respect to the divergence of views in the Cabinet on the aspects of foreign policy outlined in my 98, February 4, 8 p.m. As the information was given under the pledge of secrecy I earnestly request that this telegram be given only very guarded distribution.

[Page 137]

Mr. Eden has, he said, pressed strongly for the adoption of the views and methods outlined in that telegram. Lord Perth11 from Rome, however, has been urging an immediate and direct approach to Italy, leaving the question of Spain and anti-British-Italian propaganda in the Moslem world to be settled subsequently. This view it seems has appealed to Mr. Chamberlain12 and has had the support of the armed service departments. The view of the service departments I was told is that it is essential for Great Britain at once to detach at least one member of the German, Italian, Japanese anti-Comintern combination. Their view apparently is based on reasons of national safety as they believe if a war should break out Great Britain cannot cope with a combination of all of those powers; it becomes vitally necessary for her to settle her differences with at least one of them. Mr. Eden’s view seems to be based on the line of thought that no possible credence can be given to any promise made by Italy or Germany and that they must make some positive concrete contribution as well as Great Britain. The Spanish situation in Mr. Eden’s view would be corollary to this in that he believes there can be no real Mediterranean settlement which excludes a clearing up of Italian intentions for the future with respect to Spain. From several sources I gather that the present Foreign Office view supports Mr. Eden. This view sees the wisest approach to Anglo-Italian and Anglo-German relations as a slower process involving the satisfactory elimination of certain material causes of friction as stated in my 98, February 4, 8 p.m. But this view by no means excludes the conclusion of a rapprochement with Germany as well as Italy. Needless to say this whole controversy has taken place within the four official walls and with no authentic publicity.

My informant told me that on this cleavage of opinion Mr. Eden actually sent in his signed resignation some 10 days ago, that it caused a good deal of excitement and considerable pressure was brought on him to withdraw it, which was done.13 There is no indication yet, however, that any clear-cut decision has been reached by the Government, that is the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in Council, on the issues involved. A well informed and disinterested outside source states that the role of Vansittart14 in this matter is somewhat obscure. His anti-German feelings are of course well known and there is some reason to believe that his views are along the line of those of Lord Perth.

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Johnson
  1. Not printed.
  2. British Ambassador to Italy.
  3. Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister.
  4. Mr. Eden finally resigned on February 20, 1938.
  5. Sir Robert G. Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser, British Foreign Office.