840.48 Refugees/911½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The British Ambassador called to see me this morning. Sir Ronald Lindsay stated that he came with a formal communication from his Government in connection with the refugee question. He said that the British Government desired the Government of the United States to know that it would be willing to relinquish a portion of the immigration quota to which Great Britain was entitled under existing United States legislation in order that the remainder of its quota might be utilized for the purpose of permitting German refugees to enter the United States. The Ambassador said very frankly that he did not believe that this instruction had been considered by the British Cabinet or was other than a démarche on the part of the British Foreign Office alone and that it seemed to him in the nature of an offer by his own Government of something which the British Government did not control.
I told the Ambassador that of course this proposal would have to be laid before the President and that consequently I could only make [Page 830] a tentative and entirely personal reply. I said that the quotas granted by the Congress under our existing law were not the free property of the nations to whom they were granted, nor could the terms of the law be modified because of some other government’s willingness to modify or to relinquish the quotas which might be granted to its nationals by this law. I said that consequently it seemed to me that there were insuperable obstacles from the strictly legal aspect and I further thought that the Ambassador would understand that there were likewise objections from the standpoint of policy. I reminded the Ambassador that the President had officially stated once more only two days ago59 that there was no intention on the part of this Government to increase the quota already established for German nationals. I added that it was my very strong impression that the responsible leaders among American Jews would be the first to urge that no change in the present quota for German Jews be made.
The Ambassador seemed very much preoccupied with the message which he was instructed to communicate to this Government and asked if I really thought it necessary to bring this to the President’s attention. I said that I did not see that the Secretary or I could avoid laying this matter before the President. The Ambassador said that in any event he would see to it that no publicity was given to the suggestion made.
The Ambassador then went on to say that he had been very much disturbed by newspaper reports during the past two days of plans which it was alleged Ambassador Kennedy had presented to the British Government for the solution of the refugee question. He said that he had been informed by his Foreign Office that Mr. Kennedy had had several conversations with the British authorities during recent days with regard to the refugee matter and that Mr. Kennedy had stated that Anglo-American relations would be bound to be prejudiced by this flare-up in the refugee question because of the fact that the feeling which was created in the United States against the treatment accorded Jews and Catholics in Germany would be so intense as to provoke even more vehement and widespread criticism in America against the policy of appeasement pursued by Mr. Chamberlain. The Ambassador said that he himself feared that such widespread publicity of the alleged plan presented by Mr. Kennedy would give the general impression in the United States that some rabbit was going to be produced out of a hat and that when it was subsequently found that there was no immediate and all-embracing solution found for this problem, resentment would be provoked against the British Government.
[Page 831]I told the Ambassador that if Mr. Kennedy had any plan he had not reported it to us and that as a matter of fact, the only telegram we had received from Mr. Kennedy on this subject was a very brief message received this morning60 reporting that the British Minister of Colonies had stated that the British Government on November 21 or 22 would make some public statement as to what it was able to do with regard to the placing of refugees in territory under the sovereignty of the British Empire after consultation with the heads of the overseas dominions. I said further than that, this Government had not sent any instructions to Mr. Kennedy in the matter, nor had it instructed him to present any plan. I reminded the Ambassador that the machinery which had been set up in London as the outgrowth of the Evian Conference, namely, the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, on which this Government as well as the British Government and many other governments were represented, was believed by the United States to be the proper agency for the working out of plans of this character. I told the Ambassador that only yesterday the President had requested Mr. Myron Taylor, our representative on the Committee, to return as soon as possible to London in order to try and expedite the formulation of concrete and specific plans. I told the Ambassador that one of the greatest difficulties, if not the chief obstacle, in the formulation of such a plan had been the failure of the British Government so far to announce what portions of its dominions or colonies would be available for the settlement of refugees and that if such announcement or decision could only soon be made, if it proved to be of a satisfactory nature, it would undoubtedly do more than anything else to facilitate a speedy start towards the ultimate solution of the major problems.
The Ambassador said that he was quite familiar with this fact but that, of course, his Government had had just as much difficulty in convincing the British colonies and dominions of the need to agree to such plans as we ourselves would be faced with if we had to convince the authorities of the States of Nevada or Montana of the desirability of permitting part of their territory to be occupied by refugees. He stated, however, that his Government was now prepared to make a practical contribution, and he discussed with me at some length the territories which might be considered. He mentioned Northern Rhodesia, Kenya Colony, and British Guiana. I mentioned that I knew that Mr. Taylor had had a satisfactory conversation with Mr. MacKenzie King a little while ago but that I was not yet advised of the details of that conversation.