751.65/448: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

2120. Reference my 2117, December 15, 2 p.m.46 After speaking of the refugee problem Bonnet talked at length of the Italian demands on France and the German attitude thereto. He said that he knew the report had circulated that Ribbentrop’s attitude in this matter had caused concern to the French Government. He, Bonnet, did not hold this view. It was true that Ribbentrop had spoken of the solidarity of the Rome–Berlin Axis. At the same time Ribbentrop had said to him: “Why should I come to Paris to sign an agreement renouncing any claim to Alsace-Lorraine if I intended tomorrow to go to war with France for the purpose of satisfying Italian claims to Tunis, Corsica and Nice?” Bonnet said that while he was convinced that Germany would not go to war for Italian territorial claims on France he fully expected that Germany would give diplomatic support to Italy for claims such as Italian participation in the administration of the Suez Canal and a modification of rates on the Djibouti Railway. I remarked that the German press campaign supporting Italian territorial claims while Ribbentrop was in Paris seemed unfortunate. Bonnet said that he believed this was another example of the play of conflicting forces within the German Government. He believed that Ribbentrop was annoyed by this press campaign and that it was undertaken by Goebbels as much for the purpose of annoying Ribbentrop as for any other purpose. Bonnet added that he had said to Ribbentrop just what he stated before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber yesterday that France would go to war with Italy rather than give up an inch of French territory.

Bonnet said that the situation which would be created if Italy in fact should press territorial claims on France would be very different from that created by German claims on Czechoslovakia. In this latter case if he had wished to go to war to preserve Czechoslovakia he would have had half of France against him. If it were a question of going to war to prevent Italy seizing French territory the French people would march to the last man.

I asked about his discussion with Ribbentrop on the Spanish situation which, as he had mentioned, had occupied a good share of their private conversation the afternoon of December 7. Bonnet started to say something, hesitated and then stated merely that the conversation [Page 114] on this point had been satisfactory and that the German attitude towards Spain constituted no threat to French interests. (In this connection please refer to my 2076, December 8, 3 p.m., reporting what the Counselor of the German Embassy had said to me. It is also of interest that after the discussion of the Spanish question which evidently took place on December 6 in the presence of other members of both delegations Bonnet should have discussed this problem in private and at some length with Ribbentrop the following day). Bonnet added that he believed it would be most important if the Pan American Conference at Lima47 could be prevailed upon to address an appeal to both sides in Spain for an armistice. He said that he had instructed Saint-Quentin to discuss this with you and he read me a few lines from a telegram received from Saint-Quentin to the effect that you had stated that the matter was under consideration at Lima and that you would inform him later.

I asked Bonnet what developments he expected in the Ukraine question. He believed that there would be no early developments; the Soviet and Polish Ambassadors had told him that they also held this view. He stated that the ultimate solution of the Ukraine question would depend upon the strength and stability of the Soviet and Polish Government. If the Soviets are as strong as they claim to be and as willing to fight as they asserted they were in September to support Czechoslovakia, then there would be no change in the status of the Ukraine.

I enquired regarding Memel. Bonnet said that he did not expect serious difficulties over this question. He understood that the German and Lithuanian Governments were discussing the matter, and while he did not know what they had in mind (Ribbentrop had not mentioned this matter) he believed that whatever solution Germany desired would be accepted by Lithuania.

Wilson
  1. Post, p. 871.
  2. See vol. v, pp. 1 ff.