This memorandum is a copy of the substance of a letter I have sent the
President—and pressure of work in this office prevents my making a
separate and “clean” copy for you at this moment. I therefore do hope
that you will forgive me, under the circumstances.
With every good wish and renewed congratulations on the wonderful work
you are doing I am,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Poland (Biddle)
Many signs point to the Munich Conference and its immediate sequel’s
having already had far reaching repercussions throughout the whole
extent of the European continent. As in effect pointed out in my
previous letter, in view of the apparent check suffered by the
western powers, the smaller countries, such as those of the Oslo
group, which had already decided upon neutrality and upon
repudiation of the compulsory sanctions clauses of the League
Covenant, are already congratulating themselves on their foresight
and wisdom. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavians are
more than ever determined not to be drawn into any conflict between
the major powers.
States east and southeast of Berlin, though rapidly falling in line
with Berlin’s orientation in an economic sense, are in many cases,
still groping for some “out” (a) from
eventual German political hegemony, and (b)
from becoming the potential victims of “peaceful settlements”
between the major powers. Poland is in this category.
The Chanceries of eastern and central Europe are now apparently
practicing a “balancing policy”, characterized by a search for the
orientation whereby they may be the safest (at least temporarily so)
and wherefrom they may acquire the most benefits.
Having interpreted recent events to mean Britain’s and France’s
“evacuation” of eastern and central Europe, certain states, such as
Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary, have recently been evidencing an
inclination to look to Rome in their pursuance of a post-Munich
course of “balance diplomacy” between Berlin and Rome. Due to
Italy’s politico-economic position in central Europe, these smaller
states looked for Italy to adopt measures towards preventing German
penetration and domination in a region which Italy had hitherto
regarded as her natural and legitimate sphere of interest. Moreover,
the smaller states felt Italy might be tempted by the prospect of
acquiring for herself in these parts, the leadership which France
had apparently abandoned.
[Page 732]
For the second time however, since the Anschluss, and in this instance, at the recent
Italo-German arbitration conference in Vienna, Mussolini succumbed
to Hitler, and this blasted the hopes of statesmen of the smaller
countries to Berlin’s east for Italian support.
Though Italy may desire to resist the German drive down the Danube
valley by diplomatic and economic means, and by domestic intrigues,
she would not at this date, in my opinion, dare to challenge Germany
by force of arms. Indeed, I find it difficult to believe either in
the will or ability of Italy (unbacked by the western powers) to
stand up to Germany.
I find it equally difficult at this writing to foresee any
development which in final resort will not imply a variable degree
of German hegemony over the various individual states east and
southeast of Berlin—a hegemony which certain economic and political
arrangements between these states may mitigate, but not prevent.
Moreover, as Germany’s trade offensive effectively advances, the
states in its path can hardly afford to quarrel with their best
customer, from a trade standpoint.
As regards Germany’s post-Munich position, it is interesting to note
that as Germany emerges from the “have not” to the “have” category,
Nazi inner circles are manifesting concern over the renewed vigor
with which the western powers are arming.
Signs at the moment point to Germany’s planning on the one hand, a
period of territorial reconsolidation and digestion, and continuance
of her eastward trade offensive, on the other. Funk’s recent
southeastern tour brought to light Germany’s new form of approach to
the various trade goals envisaged in Berlin’s program. In brief,
these bilateral negotiations may be characterized as an approach to
meet the special circumstances prevailing in each country with which
Berlin aims to do business. In cases where states are
under-industrialized and thus unable to participate in the exchange
of items of the character suitable to German requirements, Germany
proposes to take in hand the organizing of an industrial structure
within such states, providing them with technicians and
materials—receiving in return food commodities and other
products.
In connection with this eastward drive, Berlin’s present mood was
characterized in effect, by the following statement recently
imparted to me by an experienced observer who enjoys close contact
with inner Nazi circles: Germany was not building a ramshackle road,
such as that which Napoleon built. The road which present-day
Germany was constructing would not tumble. While Napoleon was a
great General, he had lacked the opportunity to learn many things
present-day Germany had learned, and which only the modern world
understood—such as, economics and the regularized expansion of
population. I interpret
[Page 733]
this to mean that an almost “power drunk” and superconfident Germany
intends to have no unsympathetic or undigested portions along the
way towards its eastward goal.
My informant furthermore stated that inner Nazi circles were now
looking to Mr. Chamberlain to see what he would propose.
Accordingly, they expect great efforts to bring about European
appeasement and understandings to characterize the next three to six
months. Moreover, these circles did not anticipate at the moment a
Four-Power Pact, rather they looked for conferences of several or
more powers directly interested in any particular settlement.
As for Poland’s current position in light of Germany’s eastward
politico-economic ascendency, I am aware that while Poland has
already given evidence of “playing ball” with Germany economically,
as a temporary expedient, she realizes it is a risky game at the
best, and is seriously apprehensive in terms of the long-range
political outlook. Indeed, Warsaw deeply regrets increasing
evidences of Britain’s and France’s eastern and central European
evacuation—for, although Warsaw has for long ceased to expect
British and French military intervention in affairs of this section
of Europe, nevertheless, Warsaw regarded evidences of their active
interest in the light of a healthy balance.
As regards near future policies of the present British and French
Governments, current signs indicate that France, like Britain, will
exert efforts towards making peace with the dictators, and that
France will try to secure from Hitler a statement of peaceful
intentions somewhat along the lines of that which he made to Mr.
Chamberlain.
Just how far the demands of Hitler and his Nazi “colony-mongers” will
impede understandings of durable character between Germany, Britain
and France respectively, remains to be seen.
With every good wish [etc.]
