The attached confidential memorandum, handed to me by Mr. Messersmith on
September 29th, while prepared previous to the Munich meeting, contains
some comment and views in which you might be interested.
[Annex]
The Assistant Secretary of State (Messersmith) to the Secretary of
State
[Washington,] September 29,
1938.
Dear Mr. Secretary: Needless to say I
shared yesterday the general relief which was felt by, I am sure,
all of us when the news came over the ticker that an immediate
outbreak of hostilities was to be avoided by the four-power meeting
at Munich today. I believe, however, that thoughtful, well-informed
persons must have this optimism and relief seriously tempered by
fears that the greatest mistakes made in handling the European and
German problem may be made now. If, in the desire to avoid the war
with which Hitler is threatening Europe and the world, too
far-reaching concessions are made, we will find that instead of
arranging for peace a war has been made inevitable.
The fear of war has grown into a hysteria and there is grave danger
that in the face of the tension and psychology prevailing in Europe
today and elsewhere preliminary arrangements and promises may be
made at Munich in the next few days which, if carried through, will
either make Germany the master of Europe and of a good part of the
world eventually—with all that that involves for others and
ourselves, or a war will be made inevitable. If arrangements are
made at Munich now or in a general conference elsewhere later which
are a
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cynical sellout of
principle—just to avoid a war, and if Hitler will get promises of
economic help, which he is certain to ask for, it will mean that the
present Government in Germany will be solidified in power, given
permanence and means to exist and fatten, and then through the
avoidance of war now we should only have put Germany in a position
to carry through successfully the war which she intends to fight and
which she is not in a position to wage successfully now.
It is I believe clear that it cannot be hoped that this four-power
meeting at Munich will do more than to arrive at some preliminary
arrangements which will ward off immediate hostilities. No four
powers can sit down and settle in a few days the general problems
which are disturbing the world. Further discussions and a more
general conference would have to be called to settle these problems
and it will be a long drawn out process at the best. If promises are
made of economic adjustments now of a far-reaching character, which
promises cannot be met later, the maintenance of peace may not have
been advanced but further prejudiced. In spite of some of the
reports which we get, I am convinced that the weight of evidence is
that the economic position of Germany and Italy and Japan is much
weaker. I am convinced, out of my direct experience and observation,
that there can be no peace in the world and no real progress towards
the reestablishment of law and order as long as there is not a
return to law and order and an observance of international practice
in the present totalitarian states. These states are weak and can
not much longer continue in their present practices unless they are
given real aid of an economic nature. This is what they are after.
While the economic readjustments must be made just as much as the
political, they cannot be made at this time if it is done in a way
which will merely strengthen these totalitarian states and put them
in a position to dominate the rest of the world. This is their
unquestioned aim. If there had been any doubts as to the issues at
stake, the last few weeks should have dispelled them to any person
who can think realistically.
If the powers meeting at Munich, or which will meet later at some
other place, will be only dominated by this fear of war and the
desire to avert it at any price, then arrangements will be made,
whether we sit in or not, which will have the most far-reaching
consequences for us not only in our political relations with other
states but in our economic relationships and the repercussions on
our internal situation, political and economic, will be
far-reaching. Our trade agreements program will go by the board—we
shall have to take the crumbs which are left to us. Our
relationships with practically every state outside of this
hemisphere will become more difficult. Our problems in a good part
of this hemisphere, which are already difficult, will become
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acute. We shall ourselves
eventually be faced by war which will become just as imminent a
threat as that which has faced Europe in the last days.
I do not wish to assume and am not assuming a defeatist attitude. I
have continuously from the beginning of the totalitarian regimes
endeavored to maintain a constructive but at the same time a
realistic attitude. To face the real situation is not taking a
defeatist attitude but a realistic one. The Germany with which
certain arrangements could have been made under Stresemann11 and
Brüning12 is a different
Germany from the one we have to deal with under Hitler today in many
ways. And arrangements which were then possible, and which would
have been constructive, are today impossible until there is a regime
of law and order in Germany. Certain economic arrangements will
eventually have to be made and should be made as soon as possible
but they can only be made with safety with a Government in Germany
which has definite respect for the rights of others—large and
small—and which is not aimed at world domination.
I put forward that it is not realistic to assume that with the
gaining of its now proclaimed objectives in Czechoslovakia, Germany
will be satisfied so far as her territorial objectives are
concerned. Only a year ago the German Government said just as
definitely that it had no objective in Austria affecting the
sovereignty of Austria. Until less than six months ago the present
Government in Germany said that it had no objectives in
Czechoslovakia affecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity
but only wished to assure decent treatment of minorities. I will not
go over the long record, but I think we must view the last Hitler
pronouncement realistically and in the light of the known facts and
with the realization that with Germany made stronger now, it is
inevitable that the progress towards territorial expansion will
continue.
Nerves are giving way under the strain in more than one part of the
world. We cannot and will not let that happen here. The Monroe
Doctrine is just as much of an irritant to the present Government in
Germany as the maintenance of the Czechoslovakian State. We have in
the end the most to lose if arrangements are made now which endanger
our interests and, as I see it, there is a grave danger of that,
which must be realized by anyone who takes a long-range view and a
realistic attitude. A wise man asked me yesterday what the
difference was between Hitler taking something which didn’t belong
to him and had never belonged to his country and between Chamberlain
and Daladier giving away something which wasn’t theirs and had
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never been theirs. I am
fearful that in the arrangements about to be made, and which may be
made in the near future growing out of the Munich meeting, someone
other than ourselves is going to give away something precious that
belongs to us.
It is necessary for us, as I feel all of us in this country will, to
keep our heads and to maintain the long-range view. There are grave
dangers in the situation even in this country. A few months after
the present Government came into power, Goebbels13 was telling me what the
Party was going to do in order to regiment the German population in
every way and to make it an instrument of the state. I remarked that
the methods which had been employed in Russia and which he was
planning to employ in Germany would probably not be successful as
the German population was much more intelligent and informed.
Goebbels, who is the most profound cynic in the world today, said in
German the equivalent of the following, “There is nothing so untrue
which if repeated often enough all the people will not end in
believing”. As a fundamental practice of National Socialist
Government this requires no elucidation. How dangerously true it is
is reflected in the growing opinion in this country that the
Czechoslovakian Government has really oppressed and ravaged the
Sudeten area. The world has apparently ended in believing that what
was in reality a certain unequal treatment of the Sudeten was in
effect a regime of barbarity and oppression. There is food for
thought in this.
