760F.62/1175: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:50 p.m.]
1620. In accordance with the instructions by telephone of the Under Secretary I called on Daladier this evening, the delay in my seeing him being due to the fact that he was asleep in bed when I received my instructions.
Daladier expressed the greatest gratitude for the President’s continued efforts to preserve peace. He said “The United States of all the countries in the world is the only one that has a deep and sincere interest in the peace of Europe and whatever may happen it will go down in history to the eternal credit of the President that he is continuing to strive for peace to the last moment”.
Daladier was delighted by all the ideas I submitted to him. He said that he felt that although Hitler might not respond favorably to another appeal of the President’s his very refusal would place him in a position which some day would weaken the support that he would have from the common people of Germany. If he should respond favorably to the appeal the President would have saved the peace of the world.
Daladier said that of course he would be glad to receive an appeal to continue negotiations and to attempt to work out the transfer of Czech territory to Germany in peace.
He said that some time ago Beneš had communicated to him that he would be ready to hand over at once to Germany those portions of the Sudeten regions lying outside the Czechoslovak Maginot Line. He had therefore suggested to Beneš this afternoon at 3 o’clock and the British had made the same suggestion at 6 or 7 o’clock that the Czechoslovak Army should be withdrawn as far as the vital line of the Czechoslovak fortifications and that the German Army should be permitted to enter that portion of the Sudeten regions which lie outside the Czech Maginot Line leaving a no-man’s land between the two armies. He had not yet heard from Beneš; but he believed that Beneš would accept this proposal tomorrow morning.
Daladier said that he felt it would be most valuable to have a conference at once in a neutral capital of the states immediately interested in the problem of Czechoslovakia and that France would of course be glad to send a representative.
I asked him what states he thought should be included and he gave the list, France, England, Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. I asked him if he would object to the inclusion of Hungary. He said that he would object most emphatically because he had absolute information that the Poles, Germans, and Hungarians had agreed that [Page 687] Poland and Hungary should divide the whole of Slovakia. He would never permit this and would prefer to go to war: rather than accept it. He did not believe therefore that it would be helpful to have Hungary at the conference although Hungary was obviously one of the states most interested and must receive reasonable satisfaction.
He went on to say that when Rydz-Smigly, the Polish dictator, had been in Paris last year he had told him (Daladier) that Poland positively never would attach [attack] Czechoslovakia. At that time he (Daladier) had said to Rydz-Smigly that he personally believed that the Teschen District should be returned to Poland. In accord with this belief, he had urged Beneš for some time to return the Teschen District to Poland and Beneš had now at last made this proposal. While we were talking on this subject he received a telegram from the French Military Attaché in Warsaw in which it was stated that the Polish reply to the Czechoslovak proposals would go forward this evening and that it would be conciliatory. Daladier said that he would not believe that the Poles would act in a conciliatory manner until they had done so as he felt they were determined to have a common frontier with Hungary by the division of Slovakia.
Daladier went on to say in explaining why he would be opposed to Hungary being admitted to the conference that the Rumanians would be terribly upset if Hungary should be included and Rumania should not. At the moment Rumania was taking a strong position friendly to France and he hoped emphatically the President would not include Hungary in a call for any such conference.
Daladier then said that he felt a conference composed of England, France, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia might really work out the basis for peace in Eastern Europe. His basic thought, however, was that Hitler at the present time would accept nothing except the absolute humiliation of every nation on earth. He desired by such humiliation to make his wish law in Europe. In spite of every effort that he (Daladier) and the President might make he believed that the chance today of preserving peace in the world was not more than one in a thousand. He went on to say that Hitler’s present attitude was perhaps the greatest example of folly in modern history. Germany would be defeated in the war. France would win; but the only gainers would be the Bolsheviks as there would be social revolutions in every country of Europe and Communist regimes. The prediction which Napoleon had made at St. Helena was about to come true: “Cossacks will rule Europe”.
Before I left Daladier again expressed to me in very moving terms his gratitude to the President for his efforts. He said that he knew that the President was ahead of American public opinion and that it was difficult for him from the point of view of domestic politics to [Page 688] play the great role as the champion of the interests of humanity which he was playing. He asked me to convey his profoundest thanks.