760F.62/1171: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Bullitt ) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 27—5:44 p.m.]
1619. Wilson had a long talk this afternoon with the German Chargé d’Affaires. The latter said that in his opinion the only way of saving peace was to get the Germans and the Czechs together in a conference on the basis of acceptance of Hitler’s memorandum of September 23. He asserted that in the message from Chamberlain to Hitler, conveyed by Horace Wilson yesterday, Chamberlain had proposed negotiations between Germany and Czechoslovakia with the good offices of the British. Horace Wilson had seen Hitler before the latter’s speech last evening and had later received a written reply from Hitler. He had seen Hitler again this morning presumably after receiving cabled instructions from London and was flying back to London today.
The Chargé d’Affaires reiterated that he saw no hope of a settlement except upon the basis of complete acceptance of Hitler’s memorandum. He asserted that the Anglo-French plan accepted by Beneš, which Chamberlain presented to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, had withdrawn from the Sudeten areas to be ceded to Germany certain sections which include important Czech fortifications. He stated that Hitler was convinced that nothing could be expected from Beneš but trickery and bad faith, that Beneš was infinitely more clever than Chamberlain, Daladier or Bonnet and that despite the protection of guarantee of the British and French Governments that the areas of German majority population would be turned over to Germany, Beneš would find ways of defeating this purpose in important respects. This would mean that the basic cause of misunderstandings between Germany and Czechoslovakia would live on into the future. Czechoslovakia under Beneš was an ulcer which had to be lanced and cleaned up once and for all. Furthermore, if there is to be peace in Central Europe there will have to be a guarantee of the new frontiers of the Czech State and Germany will not participate in such a guarantee unless the minorities problem is satisfactorily settled.
Wilson stated that he personally thought there was a tragic misunderstanding going on in Berlin. It seemed to him that the belief [Page 683] existed there that Great Britain and France were willing to concede everything without a fight and would stand by passively if Germany invades Czechoslovakia on October 1. He said that on the contrary he believed that France and Britain would immediately go to war if such invasion took place.
The Chargé d’Affaires remarked that if this was the case and France and Britain preferred to fight to support Beneš in Czechoslovakia rather than to recognize Germany’s vital interests in Central Europe then it was better that the war should come now when Germany enjoyed marked military superiority. He said that the war would be a very short one and that the superior strength of the German aviation would force the other countries to sue for peace at an early date.
The Chargé d’Affaires gave impression that he still expects the French and British Governments to cave in and bring pressure to bear on the Czechoslovak Government to accept unconditionally Hitler’s memorandum.